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 In the last century, modern technology has significantly increased human 
interaction across the globe. The growing globalization of our society has created new areas 
of interest for many academics. This thesis explores the topic of international crime—
specifically, state perpetrated crimes against humanity. Criminologists have become 
increasingly interested in large-scale atrocities and several theories on the topic have been 
perpetuated in the last few decades. Through a case study, this research determined that 
current theories are capable of explaining crimes against humanity in North Korea. 
Additionally, the findings suggest that international institutions should create programs 
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During the 20th century, state-sponsored crimes were responsible for more deaths 
than all other crimes combined (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Hagan & Rymond-
Richmond, 2009; Maier-Katkin, Mears, & Bernard, 2009). Accordingly, research in 
political science, sociology, criminology, international relations, and psychology has 
drawn increasing attention to crimes against humanity and other large-scale atrocities 
involving war crimes and genocide. Crimes against humanity gained international attention 
following the atrocities of World War II and were initially outlined by the Nuremburg trials 
to include “atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population” (Allied Control Council, 1945 as cited by Maier-Katkin et 
al., 2009). Following Nuremburg, however, scholarly examination of state crime steadily 
declined as the Cold War took the spotlight.  
The 1990s brought the study of state criminality back into the limelight, as a slew 
of atrocities unfolded in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In Rwanda, widespread killings began 
with a power shift between two racial groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus. In Yugoslavia, a 
series of wars lead to the dissolution of the country. During these conflicts, several high 
ranking officials committed crimes against humanity by engaging in ethnic cleansing—the 
extermination of groups of people based on their racial background or religious beliefs. In 
response, the international community established criminal tribunals in both countries. 
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These tribunals are responsible for reshaping international laws surrounding crimes against 
humanity (CAH) over the last several decades. Additional examples of CAH violations 
within the last several decades include the apartheid enforced by the South African 
government, the genocide in Darfur ordered by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, and 
the killings in Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime (Williams, Ulbrick, & Worboys, 2012). 
International laws that address state crime are relatively new, especially in 
comparison to the domestic criminal laws that criminologists traditionally study, some of 
which can be traced back to common law. With the jurisprudence surrounding these laws 
in its infancy, there is a need to investigate international crimes and international responses 
in order to promote fair procedures and inform the enforcement of such procedures. 
Criminology offers a unique perspective capable of lessening the gap between international 
laws and international justice, as criminologists are already familiar with accomplishing 
this at the “street” and national levels. Moreover, criminological theory can inform our 
understanding of the etiology of state crime and international responses through the 
identification of both macro- and micro-level risk factors that can help identify conditions 
favorable to the commission of CAH (Harff, 2014; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Olusanya, 
2013; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2006).  
In March 2013, the UN established a commission of inquiry (COI) on human rights 
in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to determine whether and to what 
extent CAH violations are being committed. Its members consisted of Chairman Michael 
Kirby (Australia), Sonja Biserko (Serbia), and Marzuki Darusman (Indonesia) (UNGA, 
2014). On February 17, 2014 the United Nations acknowledged that CAH violations had 
occurred and are occurring in North Korea. According to the COI, North Korean CAH 
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violations include murder, torture, enslavement, rape, forced abortions, imprisonment, 
knowingly causing starvation, extermination, and persecution of people based on politics, 
religion, and gender.  
 This thesis utilizes criminological theory to frame the understanding of state 
crimes; in particular, it examines the applicability of several recent theories that attempt to 
explain crimes against humanity (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). 
Substantively, I use Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) as a case study, 
with attention to the etiology of the North Korean government’s transformation into a 
perpetrator of CAH, social conditions that may prevent or promote such crimes, and current 
international responses to these crimes.  
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will address the precursors and conditions leading to violations of 
international law by the government of North Korea (NK), the kinds of crimes the North 
Korean government has been accused of committing, how the international community has 
responded to law violations in NK, and how international institutions might strengthen 
their response in order to prevent future commission of crimes against humanity by the 
North Korean regime. This research will be guided by recent theories of CAH articulated 
by Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier Katkin et al. (2009). The findings will identify 
key turning points, some of which have been articulated in the aforementioned theories, 
that help to explain the conditions under which CAH have occurred in NK. This 
understanding, informed by conventional criminological theory, can then advise potential 
ways in which social institutions might aid in the control and mitigation of CAH by 
improving and reinforcing the international response to large-scale atrocities. 
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1.2 AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
Through a case study of NK, I will identify CAH violations and examine the 
conditions that are conducive to such crimes. For example, several scholars have suggested 
that intense societal strain is a precursor to CAH. This thesis will determine if conditions 
like widespread strain are present in the North Korean case, as well as examine contributing 
conditions like social isolation which is apparent in the case of NK. This study will focus 
on distinguishing conditions that denote a high risk of large-scale criminal activity, using 
both general criminological theories and more focused theories concerning CAH. A 
criminological assessment of CAH violations will also aid in the establishment of better 
informed international policies. Furthermore, this research will promote the understanding 
of explanatory concepts put forth by other disciplines and encourage interdisciplinary 
exploration of state crime.  
1.3 SIGNIFIGANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Many scholars have noted the importance of criminological theory for 
understanding state-sponsored CAH and have called upon criminologists to study the issue 
(Chambliss, 1988; Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, & Parker, 2005; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; 
Turk, 1964). Unfortunately, many of these calls have gone unanswered, with just a few 
criminological-oriented articles written on the subject. Several different reasons have been 
suggested as to why criminologists have not become more engaged in the study of state 
crimes, including a lack of research funding, difficulty obtaining “official” data, lack of 
interdisciplinary knowledge, a disconnect between research findings and policy 
implementation, mainstream emphasis on quantitative work, the infancy of the 
5 
 
international criminal justice system, and conceptualization and measurement issues 
(Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Matsueda, 2009; Rothe & 
Friedrichs, 2006; Smeulers & Hola, 2009).  
This current study will build upon the existing body of work that applies 
criminological theory and methods to the study of state-sponsored CAH. State criminality 
is an ever-growing concern in today’s global society because it threatens international 
security and peace. It is therefore incumbent upon politicians and world leaders to better 
understand and develop appropriate responses to such large-scale crime, especially when 
these crimes are driven by state actors with a multitude of resources at their disposal. The 
theories and methods of criminological inquiry provide a valuable perspective for gaining 
an understanding of these crimes and identifying potentially effective methods of dealing 
with the perpetrators of CAH. Furthermore, a criminological perspective will provide a 
check on the fairness and efficacy of laws formulated in our evolving international criminal 
justice system. For example, could international justice issues and policy benefit from the 
influence of restorative justice ideology? Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the 
emerging criminological research on the study of large-scale crime. 
1.4 BRIEF INTRODUCTION: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN NK 
 From 1910-1945, Japanese imperialism engulfed the country of Korea. However, 
following World War II, the international community penalized Japan with the loss of its 
Korean territory, among other sanctions (Rudolph, 1959). NK’s relationship with the 
USSR began after World War II in 1945 when the USSR was assigned trusteeship of the 
northern half of Korea. During the trusteeship period, the USSR greatly influenced NK’s 
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form of government, international relations tactics, and government policies. The USSR 
educated Soviet-born Koreans in the ideologies, policies, and values of communism and 
used these “Soviet-Koreans” to disperse communist values into North Korean society 
(Eugene Kim, 1985; Gills, 1992; A. Kim, 1970). The trusteeship established by the UN-
approved agreement between the US and the USSR bestowed informal control of North 
Korea to the Soviets. Over the next several years, Soviet strategy aimed to solidify their 
control over North Korea. Furthermore, some scholars also note that as an added measure 
of control, the Soviet-Koreans were covertly overseen by Soviet police to ensure the 
smooth implementation of communist ideologies. Communism spread throughout Asia, 
creating a “brotherhood” of nations (Eugene Kim, 1985; A. Kim, 1970; Y.-S. Kim, 1971). 
Additionally, the division of Korea in 1945, separated many families. Korean support for 
reunification was overwhelming and as such, reunification was the main goal of North and 
South Korea during this period (Gills, 1992; Millett, 2001). The Korean push for 
reunification in combination with several other factors resulted in the Korean War which 
lasted from 1950-1953.   
 The end of the Korean War resulted in a political shift away from USSR policies 
and an emphasis on Korean nationalism. During this period, Kim Il-Sung emerged as the 
Korean leader. Kim had been a household name prior to the Korean War for his efforts 
fighting Japanese imperialism. Following the war, North Koreans’ faith in the Soviets 
dissolved and Kim became a trusted symbol of national sovereignty (Lankov, 1960; 
Millett, 2001; Yang, 1980). With Kim Il-Sung as its leader, NK began to implement a series 
of plans intended to rebuild the NK economy and increase domestic industry. By the time 
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NK achieved autonomy in 1959, the people had experienced a series of taxing events 
including Japanese imperialism, several failed reunification attempts, and war.      
Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has been under autocratic rule by 
three generations of the Kim family. Upon securing his role as the “Supreme Leader” of 
NK, Kim Il-Sung was able to maintain power until his death in 1994. Following his death, 
Kim Il-Sung passed his kingdom and his power to his son Kim Jong-Il, who has also since 
died. In April 2012, Kim Jong-Un became the third member of the Kim family to reign 
over North Korea as its Supreme Leader. As such, the Kim family has reigned supreme 
over North Korean government and policies for 55 years—43 years longer than Hitler’s 
rule over Germany. The success of the Kim regime can be partly attributed to the 
isolationist policies implemented by Kim Il-Sung, many of which remain in place today 
(Gills, 1992; Lankov, 1960). 
 Only recently has the international community expressed increased interest in the 
governing tactics of the North Korean Supreme Leader and his followers. On February 17, 
2014 the COI released a detailed findings report which formally acknowledged evidence 
of North Korean crimes against humanity violations, noting that the “gravity, scale, and 
nature of these violations reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary 
world” (UNGA, 2014, p. 15). Additionally, the COI report notes that in many examples 
“the violations found entail crimes against humanity based on State policies” (UNGA, 





1.5 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 will present a review of pertinent 
literature and outline existing theories of crimes against humanity. Chapter 3 will describe 
the research methods including data collection, the case study approach, strategies used to 
increase the validity and reliability of the study, and potential limitations to case study 
methods. In Chapter 4, informed by criminological theories presented in Chapter 2, a case 
study of North Korea is presented. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of 





 Over the last several decades, criminologists have maintained an irregular 
relationship with the study of large-scale criminal activity. Criminologists have 
intermittently called for the expansion of disciplinary attention to this growing problem, 
oftentimes during periods of emerging international crisis (Aviram, 2009; Barak, 1991; 
Green & Ward, 2000; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Maier-Katkin 
et al., 2009; Matsueda, 2009; Savelsberg, 2009; Smeulers & Hola, 2009). During the last 
decade, criminologists have shown increasing interest in theoretical explanations of CAH 
(Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; 
Olusanya, 2013). Moreover, several notable criminologists, including two former 
presidents of the American Society of Criminology, William Chambliss and John Hagan, 
have increased the discipline’s attention to CAH while calling for the further 
criminological exploration of these large-scale crimes.   
2.1 LEGAL FORMULATION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
The early formation of an international law concerning CAH rests partially on the 
notion that natural laws—necessary rules determined by inherent human reason—are 
superior to laws codified by the state (Dubler, 2008). Within the field of international law, 
Hugo Grotius is credited with laying the groundwork for the codification of CAH when he 
proclaimed that certain acts could “enormously violate the laws of nature and nations” 
10 
 
(Grotius, 1925, as cited by Dubler, 2008). Grotius’s idea that certain crimes are 
unacceptable is reflected in international law through the concept of jus cogens, which 
dictates that certain obligations must be fulfilled by all states (Köchler, 2003). Adapted 
from the legal concept of jus cogens, “universal jurisdiction” allows any recognized 
international entity to hold criminal dominion over any accused person. A crime is 
considered universal because the nature and gravity of the act would not be condoned by 
any national government claiming legitimacy. As Dubler (2008) denotes, this precept led 
to state intervention in the affairs of other states several times throughout history, but only 
in extreme cases.1 Intervention in another state’s affairs based on natural laws suggested 
that a majority of nations view these acts as unlawful, thus suggesting that the laws of 
nature have maintained an influence on contemporary international law embedded in the 
concept of jus cogens. Moreover, in 1966 the United Nations International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights recognized “the inherent dignity… and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family” (U.N.T.S., 1976, p. 172). Furthermore, Article 15(2) of the 
covenant alludes to a “general principle of law recognized by the community of nations” 
(U.N.T.S., 1976, p. 177). Although the Covenant was ratified by just 35 nations, this article 
was later utilized as the foundation for prosecuting CAH in the Nuremburg trials.  
This connection between international law and natural law is important because it 
suggests that international violations of state sovereignty should ultimately serve to uphold 
the ideals of natural law. Criminology may offer a fresh perspective on international 
jurisprudence considering the discipline’s theoretical engagement with natural law 
                                                            
1 Some examples include the trial of Charles I in 1649, in which the Solicitor General John Cooke argued 
that the king must still submit to the law and God, and Vietnam’s utilization of force to overthrow Pol Pot 
(Dubler, 2008; Williams et al., 2012). 
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principles and English common law. Still, the notion of CAH continues to evolve beyond 
its original natural law influence.  
 Eventually, the positivist school of thought influenced the formation of 
international law, further contributing to the jurisprudence of crimes against humanity. One 
of positivism’s central tenets is that laws are valid because they are derived from logical 
decisions made by authority. As such, authority will enact laws that preserve and protect 
the society that legitimizes its power. From this logic, the biggest contribution of positivism 
was the belief that civil interactions between countries is necessary for the maintenance of 
peace. From this influence, the Nuremburg trials determined that under international law, 
a crime against humanity must: (1) be considered a “universal crime,” that is— an act that 
“shocks the conscience of humanity” and (2) must threaten international tranquility 
(Dubler, 2008; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2012). The Nuremburg trials 
were responsible for a broad expansion in the understanding of CAH, as well as the 
concept’s codification. 
The original definition of CAH was formulated during the Nuremburg Trials and 
has since been modified by countless statutes, councils, charters, covenants, and tribunals. 
However, as previously discussed, these crimes were not initially codified. Therefore, it 
was important that laws and procedures were officially established to ensure the fairness 
of the Nuremburg trials. As a result, the Nuremburg Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (1945) decreed that the Axis Powers could be tried for three specific crimes—




…murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal (Nuremburg, 1945). 
 
Moreover, the Charter states that all losing countries could be tried even if the 
crimes committed were not considered a violation of law within their own country. The 
clear conceptualization and codification of CAH offered by the Nuremburg Charter was a 
pivotal moment that provided recognition of these crimes, as well as a building block for 
the formation of international institutions suitable to deal with such crimes. The general 
study of this phenomenon stalled after the completion of the Nuremburg trials, due to the 
fact that there “was a shortage of dictators accused of committing atrocities” (Dubler, 2008, 
p. 96). 
The end of the Nuremburg trials left the legal formulation of crimes against 
humanity in a state of gridlock. The definition of these crimes had been expanded further 
than ever before, but Nuremburg also set a precedent that these crimes were only 
committed during times of war. This meant that only crimes committed before and during 
war could be prosecuted, which limited the ability of nations to respond to atrocities based 
on natural law or human rights arguments. Instead, the Nuremburg definition demanded 
that the main goal of prosecuting these crimes should be the maintenance of international 
peace through nonintervention (Dubler, 2008; UNGA, 1946). Still, the clarification offered 
by the Nuremburg Trials was short-lived since the international community lacked an 
accepted definition of “war.” Consequently, the grounds for prosecution of CAH 
perpetrators narrowed and the study of these crimes experienced a lull until a resurgence 
in the 1990s.  
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International Institutions. The United Nations (UN) was commissioned by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt with its goal being to promote international peace and 
cooperation. The UN Charter went into effect on October 24, 1945. Chapter VII of the 
Charter dictates that the UN may take action in the presence of “any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and that the Security Council—a group of five 
permanent member states with veto power and ten rotating member states, elected by all 
member states for a two-year tenure—will determine whether or not to respond with 
military action. Nonmilitary responses to international threats include “complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (U.N., 1945, p. 9). 
However, as discussed above, a period of non-violence occurred following World War II 
and as such, the UN would not become involved in international matters immediately.   
Dubler (2008) notes that between 1992 and 1993, the UN evoked its Chapter VII 
power in several conflicts including Angola, Haiti, Liberia, and Somalia. This sudden 
upsurge of international conflict caused the UN Security Council to firmly respond to 
accusations of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia with the creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) — one of several entities established with the 
“power to prosecute” those responsible for mass atrocities (U.N., 1945; U.N.S.C., 1993, p. 
5). For the most part, the ICTY statutes defining CAH relied greatly on Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremburg Charter that was outlined above. Therefore, CAH had to be linked to war in 
order for the international community to interfere in another state’s sovereignty. This 
presented a problem for the international community because no war had been officially 
declared. Later developments would remove these restraints on nonintervention without a 
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declaration of war. However, simply establishing the ITCY was not enough to quell the 
state sponsored violence. As a result, the magnitude of the violence in Yugoslavia 
continued to not only imperiled the nation’s internal security, but also the peace of adjacent 
countries. Hagan and his colleagues expand on the ineffectiveness of the ICTY:  
…The Tribunal began in 1993 with little more than a U.N. Security Council 
resolution and a handful of employees, with no sustaining budget, no building, no policing 
mechanism, or personnel, and most notably, no detainees to place on trial (Hagan, Levi, & 
Ferrales, 2014, p. 589).  
The UN has since established other international bodies capable of prosecuting perpetrators 
of crimes against humanity. The entities have been successful in drawing attention to 
crimes against humanity and the perpetrators of such crimes.  
In 1998, the Rome Conference established the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
a permanent international criminal tribunal intended to be used as a last resort for the 
prosecution of international crimes. The Conference consisted of 236 nongovernmental 
organizations, 160 states, and 33 international organizations. Most notably, Article 7 of the 
ICC statute redefined crimes against humanity (Mullins & Rothe, 2004). Rather than being 
limited to acts committed only before and during war, the definition of crimes against 
humanity was expanded to include all “attacks directed against any civilian population” 
(UNGA, 1998, p.11). This definition expanded the study of CAH beyond the limited 
purview of “war crimes.” The ICC statute declares that these attacks should be in 
accordance with state or organizational policy and, in doing so, acknowledges that the state 
and its actors can be held responsible for committing crimes against humanity.  
While the definition has continued to evolve over time, the main sentiment has 
remained the same—crimes against humanity are “particularly odious offenses in that they 
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constitute a serious attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or a degradation of human 
beings” (Horton, 2005, p. 201). Although this thesis examines the North Korean regime as 
a state perpetrator of crimes against humanity, it is important to understand that not all 
crimes against humanity are committed by the state or state-sponsored actors. Throughout 
history, these atrocities have also been executed by political and religious radical groups 
(Dubler, 2008).  
Over the years, as state crime has increasingly become the subject of criminological 
inquiry, research has focused on global financial crimes, genocide, and CAH (Friedrichs 
& Friedrichs, 2002; Friedrichs, 2009; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Hagan & Rymond-
Richmond, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Matsueda, 2009). However, 
considerably less attention has been given to crimes against humanity. Traditionally, 
genocide and crimes against humanity have been treated as separate legal concepts, 
although recognition of this distinction is not universal (Harff, Marshall, & Gurr, 2005; 
Harff, 1995). Murder as a crime against humanity, involves the “widespread and 
systematic” killing of a significant number of individuals. On the other hand, murder as 
genocide seeks the complete eradication of a specific cultural or ethnic group (Dubler, 
2008; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Williams et al., 2012). While the motives 
behind these crimes may differ, they find common ground in their systematic, large-scale 
nature. Therefore, this thesis conceptualizes “crimes against humanity” as large-scale 





2.2 CRIMINOLOGY AND STATE CRIME 
Can “the state” commit a crime? In 1964, Austin Turk challenged scholars to widen 
their scope of study and to push the boundaries of the definition of crime. He encouraged 
the “conceptualization of criminology as a scientific instead of an ‘applied’ discipline” 
(Turk, 1964, p. 454). Additionally, in a Presidential Address to the American Society of 
Criminology, William Chambliss called upon criminologists to specifically explore state-
sponsored crime (Chambliss, 1988). Chambliss suggested that criminologist must agree on 
a definition of crime that allows for the maintenance and growth of the discipline, sparking 
a debate over whether or not criminology has a place in the discussion of state crime. The 
conceptualization and definitional issues raised by Chambliss continue to be debated in 
recent scholarship (Cohen, 1990; Green & Ward, 2000; Rothe & Friedrichs, 2006). 
 The very notion of examining state-sponsored CAH through a criminological lens 
is controversial in and of itself. Opponents of criminological assessments of state crime 
hinge their arguments on the notion that a “state” is incapable of committing crime. These 
scholars argue that criminal law does not apply to the state, as the state is the entity that 
enforces and legitimizes the law (Cohen, 1990; Green & Ward, 2000). However, Rothe 
and Friedrichs (2006) address this claim using Schwendinger and Schwendinger’s (1970) 
suggestion that crime could also be measured by society using the concept of human rights 
whereby any violation of human rights is considered criminal. This rebuttal is pertinent 
considering criminology’s familiarity with human rights. However, more simplistic 
explanations exist. As Hagan notes, the Nuremburg trials established a precedent in 
international law which has been utilized to bring claims of CAH violations against 
multiple people and countries (Hagan et al., 2005; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). As outlined 
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above, the UN has introduced several new bodies capable of prosecuting perpetrators of 
CAH, most notably the International Criminal Court. The establishment of international 
courts has provided a legitimate means of holding “the state” culpable for CAH.  
In 2005, Kramer and Michalowski proposed a synthesized definition:  
State crime is any action that violates public international law, international 
criminal law, or domestic law when these actions are committed by individuals acting in 
official or covert capacity as agents of the state pursuant to expressed or implied orders of 
the state, or resulting from state failure to exercise due diligence over the actions of its 
agents. (p. 2) 
This definition links the international laws regarding CAH and the criminological concept 
of state crime by regarding such crime as a violation of “public international law, 
international criminal law, or domestic law.” Thus, “state crime” is defined to include 
crimes against humanity committed by the state or state actors in pursuance of state 
policies. The next section reviews relevant empirical scholarship on state-sponsored crimes 
against humanity. 
2.3 CRIMINOLOGY OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
 To date, scholars concerned with the criminology of state-sponsored CAH have 
centered their analyses on specific crimes defined by international law. International law 
recognizes state-perpetrated war crimes, genocides, and crimes against humanity as 
separate concepts differentiated by intent. Although the impetus behind these state-
sponsored crimes may differ, their means and ends are very much the same. This thesis, 
therefore, adopts a broad definition of state-sponsored crimes against humanity, of which 
war crimes and crimes of genocide are considered special cases. In other words, this thesis 
will consider state-sponsored crimes against humanity to include any perpetration of 
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“widespread and systematic” crime that “shocks the conscience of humanity” in adherence 
to or as a result of state policies.  
This approach is consistent with Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) as they note how 
the UN definitions that influence international laws are oftentimes “developed in a highly 
politicized context” and, as such, they consider all instances of large-scale mass murders 
of innocent noncombatants in their scope of inquiry. According to their analysis, 
generalizing international laws regarding state-sponsored crimes will allow criminologists 
to study the concept of state crime without the “limitations of actus reus” (i.e., a guilty act) 
given that the crime is considered universal (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003, p. 110). 
Criminologists’ circumscribed approach to state crimes might first be expanded through 
the application of existing theories. A deeper understanding of “widespread and 
systematic” crime not only has theoretical implications, but has practical applications for 
improving the functioning and operation of the international criminal justice system.  
 Furthermore, Brannigan and Hardwick (2003), influenced by Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s A General Theory of Crime (1990), advocate utilizing a “broad or general scope” 
when analyzing CAH. Thus, they outline seven “hard facts” about genocide and CAH: (1) 
there is a pre-existing group conflict, (2) perpetrators are ordinary people working as a 
group towards some perceived higher purpose, (3) perpetrators utilize techniques of 
neutralization, (4) the state perpetuates group conflict, (5) the victims are defenseless, (6) 
deaths must be “considerable,” and (7) genocide can be deterred. Brannigan and Hardwick 
illustrate these hard facts using examples found in the genocides of Bosnia and Rwanda. 
Some scholars view these “hard facts” as irrelevant or unrelated to Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s general theory (Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). However, Brannigan and Hardwick 
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note that they use the term “general theory” in a much broader sense than was ever intended 
by Gottfredson and Hirschi. Instead of challenging the ideas of Gottfredson and Hirschi, 
they wish for their theory to be considered separate from, although largely influenced by, 
self-control theory.  
The individual-level analysis proposed by Brannigan and Hardwick poses no 
problem for the explanation of group action. As they point out, Gottfresdson and Hirschi 
(1990) have already addressed this issue, arguing that at the heart of collective action is the 
action of multiple individuals (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003). Although they explore 
genocide through the lens of an individual-level theory, their conclusion suggests that the 
state is capable of encouraging genocide through similar mechanisms traditionally linked 
to low self-control (e.g., ineffective parenting techniques). These common threads propose 
that state crimes such as genocide could be the product of inculcated ideologies—
suggesting the utility of exploring state-sponsored crimes against humanity from a life 
course perspective that emphasizes self-control and social bonds (Elder & Rockwell, 
1979).  
 Maier-Katkin and his colleagues offer a comprehensive criminological theory in 
their article “Towards a Criminology of Crimes Against Humanity” (Maier-Katkin et al., 
2009). The six contentions delineated by Maier-Katkin et al. are contingent upon one 
another and lay the groundwork for a theory of CAH. Proposition 1 contends that as a “pre-
condition” to the occurrence of these crimes, a society experiences intense and widespread 
strain. Further, they hold that the deeper and more prevalent strain is within a society, the 
more likely CAH will occur. Proposition 2 holds that in the presence of societal strain, 
individual-level fears increase, causing individuals to form into identifiable groups. 
20 
 
Proposition 3 states that these individuals then begin to internalize the norms of their 
groups in order to combat the feelings of fear experienced by the breakdown of society. 
They refer to this phenomenon as group socialization. Next, Proposition 4 notes that group 
socialization contributes to the structure of a group, increasing its ability to function 
successfully. Proposition 5 states that CAH are more likely to occur in groups whose 
dynamics are grounded in dehumanization, violence, and self-interest. Finally, Proposition 
6 holds that as per Propositions 1-5, violent acts will likely ensue against non-threatening 
groups, especially in cases where the true source of strain is not susceptible to attack. 
From these six propositions, the authors draw several generalizations concerning 
why individuals participate in crimes against humanity. First, they concede that the 
occurrence of CAH is the result of a multitude of events occurring simultaneously, 
including “societal, local community, group level, and individual level factors” (Maier-
Katkin et al., 2009, p. 248). Next, they highlight the important role self-interest plays in 
the occurrence of CAH. They contend that groups take violent actions in order to protect 
themselves from becoming the target of such actions. Finally, they acknowledge that their 
theory is preliminary and subject to revision. 
Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) provide a case study of Jedwabne, Poland as a backdrop 
for theoretical exposition. For example, shortly after the Nazi’s gained control of Poland, 
Polish civilians began to turn on their Jewish neighbors resulting in a slaughter of Jewish 
people living in the town. Local Polish civilians even traveled to town to witness the 
killings. Based on their examination of the Jedwabne killings, Maier-Katkin et al (2009) 
suggest that the causes of criminal activity derive from two sets of factors: individual 
characteristics (micro) and social conditions (macro). Next, they argue that individual-level 
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theories cannot fully explain crimes against humanity because these theories tend to ignore 
social context and, as we have learned, social context is critical to understanding human 
behavior. This sentiment has been exposited during several other discussions of criminality 
(Browning, 1993; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; Olusanya, 2013; Zimbardo, 2007; 
Zimbardo et al., 1971). Maier-Katkin and colleagues thus eschew solely individual-based 
explanations because they do not account for the important role that social context plays in 
state crime. Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) offers an important insight into the contributing 
social factors of CAH, as well as the overall understanding of state-sponsored crimes. 
Although they largely criticize Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) for exploring these crimes 
through individual-level theory, the propositions outlined by Maier-Kaktin and colleagues’ 
group-level analysis are strikingly similar to Brannigan and Hardwick’s “seven hard facts,” 
providing some support for Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) claim that, in the end, 
collective action is comprised of individual actions. 
Many scholars have considered the notion that perpetrators of CAH to be normal 
people who were simply following orders or striving to achieve their own personal goals. 
For example, Browning (1993) explores this popular theory in his book Ordinary Men, 
which examines how an average group of middle-aged policemen initiated one of the 
largest recognized genocides in history—the holocaust. Browning writes that: 
Within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures 
on behavior and sets moral norms. If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become 
killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot? (p. 189). 
This concept has been studied in the field of criminology for some time, best exemplified 
by Phillip Zimbardo’s classic prison experiment on power and social control, which placed 
undergraduate volunteers in the roles of guards and inmates. Ultimately, the experiment 
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had to be stopped after ordinary college students transformed into “perpetrators of evil” 
(Zimbardo, 2007; Zimbardo et al., 1971). Zimbardo concluded that this was due to the 
internalization of the roles that had been assigned. For example, although the roles of guard 
and prisoner were assigned at random, the guards did not allow prisoners to empty their 
sanitation buckets, which served as their restroom; in other cases, guards would place 
inmates in a dark closet as a form of solitary confinement (Zimbardo et al., 1971, p. 7). 
Both Browning’s and Zimbardo’s work suggests that human behavior is highly dependent 
on context—a theme that is present in many criminological theories (e.g., social 
disorganization, institutional anomie, broken windows, social learning, self-control). 
Moreover, these concepts are also present in the analysis of CAH provided by Brannigan 
and Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al (2009). Figure 2.1 provides a synthesized 
outline of the major points presented by both theories. Overall, Maier-Katkin’s (2009) 
organizational structure is utilized, while Brannigan & Hardwick’s (italicized) (2003) 
contentions are used to clarify and expand on the theoretical propositions outlined by 
Maier-Katkin.  
 Many theorists continue to recognize the influential role of social context. 
Additionally, some criminologists have acknowledged the importance of examining CAH 
on the micro- and macro-levels and continue to develop new approaches to explaining 
large-scale criminality. For example, John Hagan has conducted a criminological 
exploration of genocide that appeals to mainstream criminologists through his quantitative 
studies of genocide in Darfur (Hoffman, 2009; Matsueda, 2009). Hagan’s (2008) book on 




Figure 2.1 Synthesized Theoretical Outline 
INTENSE, WIDESPREAD 
STRAIN occurs on a social and 
individual level as a precursor to 
CAH. Intensity and prevalence of 
strain will determine the 
likelyhood that CAH will ensue. 
Strain produces high levels of 
fear. Certain events are easily 
identifiable as strain (i.e. war, 
famine, economic depression), 
because these events threaten 
personal security and demarcates 
indidviduals.
Widespread fear results in the 
deterioriation of conventional 
social bonds leading to the 
formation of  NEW PRIMARY 
GROUP AFFILIATIONS built 
around an "us versus them" 
mentality. This mentality 
encourages individuals to form 
groups with people who share 
similar beliefs. PRIMARY 
GROUP SOCIALIZATION 
legitimizes group actions, which 
clouds culpability-- this is espcially 
true for structured groups that 
value obedience. 
The GROUP STRUCTURE AND 
DYNAMICS of the new primary 
group structure are influenced by the 
intensity and prevalence of strain as 
well as the diffusion of socialization 
into social roles. Group structure 
determines authority and law 
systems. Authority and law systems 
influence the availability of social 
roles. CAH are more likely to occur 
when "ordinary" individuals 
subscribe to the new social roles 
assigned to them by the authority 
system. Following the formation of 
new primary group structures, normal 
group processes of socialization and 
conformity ensue. 
CAH are more likley to occur in 
groups whose BELIEF 
SYSTEMS encourage values 
often associated with immediate 
self-interest, dehumanization and 
violence. These beliefs are 
legitimized through group action. 
Moreover, authority and law 
systems will play a role in the 
dispersion and socialization of 
primary group beliefs. 
This process will likely result in 
the DISPLACEMENT OF 
AGGRESSION. Primary group 
structure, group action, group 
dynamics, and group beliefs will 
encourge the use of violence, 




Using the same methodological approach implemented in his 2005 Criminology article, 
Hagan’s book utilizes data from the 2004 Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) which  
was conducted by the U.S. State Department  (Hagan et al., 2005). The ADS surveyed 1136 
Darfur refugees that had been placed in United Nations Displacement Camps. 
Hagan’s work takes a case study approach to the exploration of genocide by 
recording individual accounts of state violations of international law in Darfur, highlighting 
the importance of gathering the accounts of multiple witnesses when studying crimes on 
such a large-scale level (Moon, 2011). Recall that Turk also asserted the importance of 
individual perceptions of crimes (Turk, 1964). Hagan’s work has been extended with 
colleagues in several articles on the genocide in Darfur during the last decade.  He has 
examined the inadequate response of the United States to the Rwandan genocide, the effect 
of this failure on current responses to the genocide in Darfur, the link between the US war 
on terror and the genocide in Darfur, a quantitative approach to proving genocidal intent, 
the efficiency and sustainability of the ICC, the social construction of administrative 
entities like the ITCY, and the unique ways in which international law is formed through 
the networking of these organizations (Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Hagan et al., 2014, 2005; 
Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009). His work is responsible for engendering wider 
criminological attention into state crimes of genocide.  
His book alone produced four reviews from scholars published in Theoretical 
Criminology in 2009, as well as a reply from Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond 
(Aviram, 2009; Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Matsueda, 2009; 
Savelsberg, 2009). Hagan’s book further explores his utilization of the ADS data to prove 
the genocidal intent of state-led Arabs Muslims against their African Muslims neighbors. 
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Additionally, Hagan’s work draws attention to international criminal tribunals (ICT) and 
the ICC. Specifically, in his most recent work he teams up with Ron Levi and Gabrielle 
Ferrales to examine the ICT established in Darfur (Hagan et al., 2014). They emphasize 
that the legal formulation of state crimes was heavily influenced by the decisions and 
actions of these international institutions, rather than legislative bodies. They further 
explore the increasing politicization of the international criminal justice system, noting the 
relevant connections to conflict theory—emphasizing the extreme political nature of the 
international criminal justice system (Hagan et al., 2014). This is a logical connection 
considering that the codification of crimes like genocide were the result of the World War 
II victors influence on international legal concepts. The politicization of the international 
justice system further supports the argument that social context affects the likelihood that 
CAH will occur. Hagan’s work stands as an important contribution to the field, especially 
when considering the policy implications of CAH research.  
The effectiveness of intervention relies heavily on the ability of these international 
institutions to hold perpetrators accountable; however, more study is needed on conditions 
that lead to the emergence of ICTs in order to strengthen their responses (Hagan & Kaiser, 
2011; Hagan et al., 2014; Hola, Bijleveld, & Smeulers, 2011). Many scholars encourage 
the study of these international organizations in hopes that improving their functioning will 
lead to a permanent place for them in the international criminal justice system (Hagan et 
al., 2014; Hola, Bijleveld, & Smeulers, 2011; Moon, 2011). In an attempt to achieve this, 
Hagan and his colleagues explore the recent push to make institutions like the International 
Criminal Court permanent. Much like the American criminal justice system, the 
international system is divided on many critical issues. Debate on this issue has 
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underscored the influence of international political agendas on ICTs, specifically their 
definitions and enforcement of state crimes (Fouzder, 2011; Hagan et al., 2014).  
Hagan’s examination of genocide in Darfur has clearly highlighted the importance 
of understanding the origins of these criminal regimes, which can help to inform ICTs of 
the potential warning signs of large-scale, systematic crime and determine the most 
effective way to hold perpetrators accountable for CAH. This thesis seeks to expand the 
application of general criminological theories to the study of state crime and promote a 
more thorough understanding of the origins of these types of crimes. Due to the extreme 
nature of CAH cases, a broader understanding of this phenomenon has the potential to 
improve the functionality of the international criminal justice system. 
 As discussed above, there has been some debate in criminology as to whether or 
not individual-level explanations of crime can aid the exploration of state crime. 
Examination of the relevant literature on state crime suggests that a combination of 
individual and group-level theories would aid our understanding of state crime (Brannigan 
& Hardwick, 2003; Hagan et al., 2014; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; Olusanya, 2013). In part, 
this is largely due to the complex nature of international relations. Despite this complexity, 
initial examinations of CAH have produced similar theoretical propositions. Both 
Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al (2009) present their theories as a set 
of sequential events that must occur in order for CAH violations to ensue, whereas Hagan 
and colleagues highlight the volatile nature of the current international justice system and 
suggest that social context will largely influence the effectiveness of CAH policies and 
punishment. Therefore, this case study will apply these theoretical orientations to an 
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investigation of the individual and social conditions that influence the perpetration of 





3.1 CASE STUDY METHOD  
Methodologically, this thesis relies on case study methods in order to determine the 
extent to which current theories explain CAH violations in NK. This method relies on the 
systematic collection and analysis of multiple data sources. Beyond the use of multiple data 
sources, Yin (2014) identifies several other key factors that maintain the validity and 
reliability of case study findings: (1) establish a chain of evidence, (2) build upon existing 
explanations, (3) address rival explanations, (4) use logic models to match empirical 
observations to theoretical predictions, (5) use theory in single case studies, and (6) develop 
a case study database. These strategies have been implemented throughout the research 
design, data collection, and data analysis stages of this thesis. 
3.2 CASE STUDY METHOD FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
Taking a qualitative approach to state crime requires the application of a structured 
research method. Case study methods have been utilized in this research to highlight 
patterns, emphasize relationships between variables, draw comparisons, and to encourage 
conceptual/theoretical consistency through the construction of a logical chain of evidence. 
Specifically, these methods have shaped the design of this study by supplying a stable 
framework to analyze CAH committed in NK. A holistic, single-case study method was 
chosen because this type of examination can add to the knowledge base of state crime by 
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“contributing, challenging, or extending theory” and can help organize information to 
identify related subunits for future research designs (Yin, 2014, p. 51). Therefore, this 
method is extremely useful for exploring new phenomena.   
With recent evidence increasingly confirming that North Korean government 
officials are responsible for long-running CAH violations against the civilian population 
(UNGA, 2014), NK provides the unique opportunity to examine a case of CAH. The UN 
Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in NK has labeled these violations 
“unspeakable” (UNGA, 2014). Therefore, NK provides an extreme platform for exploring 
the generality of CAH theories.  
3.3 SOURCE OF DATA 
 The study of NK presents a particularly difficult challenge because access to the 
country is strictly controlled by the government and oversight by outside monitors is very 
limited. Consequently, secondary data is the primary source of evidence for this study. To 
reduce threats to validity, the study’s data were obtained from multiple sources, including 
existing historical literature, UN Commission reports, and the COI interviews of 
eyewitnesses and victims (Yin, 2014). Supplementary data sources include video of the 
interviews conducted by the UN and government records. Specific examples of documents 
used in this research are listed in Table 3.1 below. Yin (2014) argues that the triangulation 
of multiple data sources should be utilized to increase validity. These data sources were 
analyzed for points of convergence to assess the nature and extent of CAH violations in 
NK, how these crimes continue to occur despite international pressure, and how the 
international community can improve the efficacy of its response. The qualitative analysis  
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Table 3.1 Data Sources 




Conducted by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
Interviews record the eye witness testimony of 80 people including 
former prison camp guards and prisoners, and previous supporters of 
the Kim regime 
Historical 
Information 




USSR records concerning the Korean War and Korean relations 





Question and answer sessions regarding the conditions of North 
Korea with the commissioner, Mr. Michael Kirby 




program Dedoose was used as the analytic platform for conducting this study. Dedoose 
helped to organize a “case study database” in which text is coded for the purpose of 
developing and connecting common themes across multiple sources.  
3.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR METHODS 
Case study research has long been associated with the study of state crimes 
(Browning, 1993; Fouzder, 2011; Friedrichs & Friedrichs, 2002; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; 
Hagan et al., 2005; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). Case study research is best utilized to convey 
an understanding of a complex subject. Additionally, these methods can expand knowledge 
and evaluate what has already been theorized in previous research. The international 
criminal justice system is relatively new, and while the ICTs and the ICC have established 
definitions for crimes like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, we still 
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require comprehensive understanding of the etiology and course of these crimes. The 
detailed examination of specific examples of these types of violations will allow us to 
uncover “analytical generalizations” that will facilitate the study of state crimes (Yin, 
2014). 
3.5 CODING 
This case study examines the historical and political developments of North Korea 
and aims to outline the impact of these developments on North Korean civilian and 
government involvement in CAH. Furthermore, this case study facilitates the examination 
of specific examples of CAH violations in NK through the lens of existing theories of CAH 
articulated by Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al. (2009). Even more, 
this thesis aims to distinguish specific factors that facilitate the increase of crimes against 
humanity in North Korea and will explore these concepts from both macro- and micro-
levels. Sources from multiple decades were analyzed using Dedoose in order to identify 
policies and patterns throughout North Korean history. 
  A review of the existing literature has suggested that strain, self-control, and social 
bonds will be helpful in guiding my analysis of crimes against humanity (Brannigan & 
Hardwick, 2003; Browning, 1993; Hagan & Kaiser, 2011; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009; 
Mullins & Rothe, 2004; Sampson, 2005). As such, codes for each theory were created. The 
codes include: intense, widespread strain, new primary group affiliations, primary group 





A CASE STUDY: NORTH KOREA 
 Testimonies recorded by the UN’s COI suggest that some CAH violations have 
been occurring in NK starting as early as 1958. However, the commission has only recently 
investigated claims of violations. Information about the type of crimes facilitated by the 
North Korean government is limited. One explanation for this is offered by former political 
prisoner, Kim Young-Soon. She discusses how it took many years for the Korean people 
to become dissatisfied with the policies of the Kim family and even more time before they 
were willing to speak out against them, stating that “We [North Koreans] speak what is 
written in the script, that’s the North Korean society” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013, 
p. 17). This is one possible reason that it has taken so long for the international community 
to acknowledge these atrocities. Only recently has the UN’s COI has been able to retrieve 
more information on the current human rights situation in North Korea.  
In February 2014 the COI officially concluded that crimes against humanity 
violations are occurring in NK. The COI was able to draw this conclusion based on the 
testimony of over 80 first-hand accounts of CAH in NK as well as expert testimony. 
Interviews were conducted by all members of the Commission in a transparent public 
setting. By the end of its investigation the COI had conducted more than 240 interviews 
consisting of eye-witness and expert testimony. North Korea officials have maintained that 
the testimony heard by the Commission is false testimony provided by “fugitives” and 
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“terrorists” adding that the COI’s report is “steeped in selectivity and double standard by 
gathering one-sided materials devoid of scientific accuracy and objectivity in content” 
(“Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies,” 2014, pp. 12–13). 
However, the UN contends that there is no incentive for false testimony against NK. Many 
witnesses, although living outside of the borders of NK, continued to fear reprisal (Kirby, 
Biserko, & Darusman, 2013e, 2013k, 2013m). Some witnesses chose not to participate 
based on this fear, which even the assurance of confidentiality could not overcome (UNGA, 
2014). Additionally, satellite imagery was utilized to corroborate testimony given by 
interviewees in regards to prison camp locations and the triangulation of sources was used 
to increase the validity and reliability of the Commission’s report.  Between 2013 and 2014 
the COI conducted interviews in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington, DC. The COI 
invited NK to send a representative to each of the proceedings, however NK did not 
respond to this offer. The CAH theories articulated by Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and 
Maier-Katkin et al (2009) were summarized above in Figure 2.1. Can these theories help 
explain the manifestation of crimes against humanity in North Korea? 
4.1 INTENSE, WIDESPREAD STRAIN 
Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory has long held that criminal behavior is more 
likely in environments that contain multiple sources of intense, widespread strain. 
Following Agnew’s logic, both Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al. 
(2009) highlight the critical role of strain in CAH—contending that pre-existing 
widespread strain is a catalyst for large-scale criminality. Strain can arise from many 
sources such as racial tension, religious intolerance, political differences, and economic 
crisis to name a few. Maier-Katkin et al (2009) acknowledge that strain is dynamic and, 
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furthermore, strain itself is not sufficient to produce CAH. However, intense strain is the 
first identifiable precursor to CAH violations. As Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) suggest, 
certain situations produce intense strain on a large-scale (i.e. colonization, war, economic 
depression). Examples of strain in the case of NK can be categorized on two levels—macro 
(social) and micro (individual). In the case of North Korea, large-scale societal strain 
encouraged widespread individual strain. 
North Korea’s history contains several clear instances of long-running, social 
strain. The conclusion of World War II brought the end of Japanese imperialism in Korea. 
Burdened by seven decades of Japanese rule, the Korean people had long been hopeful for 
a free Korea (Armstrong, 2005; A. Kim, 1970). This sentiment has recently been reinforced 
in a report issued by North Korea's Association for Human Rights Studies, in which life 
under Japanese rule was branded as “miserable,” adding that, 
Each and every law instituted by Japan for governance of Korea in the past was 
unprecedentedly evil, anti-human rights laws aimed at depriving the Korean people of all 
their political freedom and rights and forcing colonial slavery upon them (“Report of the 
DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies,” 2014, p. 14) 
In addition, towards the end of Japanese imperialism, the socioeconomic conditions in 
Korea were extremely unstable. As such, in 1945 the people of North Korea welcomed 
Soviet forces into their country and believed that the USSR would be able to help NK hold 
elections in order to secure sovereignty (G.-D. Kim, 1990). 
Scholars believe that a consequence of Japanese imperialism in Korea was a 
population “ripe for radicalization” (Gills, 1992, p. 108). The interpretation that intense, 
widespread strain would be subsequently followed by the deterioration of Japanese-
influenced group structures, allowing for the emergence and acceptance of USSR-
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influenced group structures is consistent with ideas propositioned by Maier-Katkin et al 
(2009). Furthermore, CAH violations are more likely to occur when new primary group 
affiliations are premised on non-conventional belief systems (Brannigan & Hardwick, 
2003; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). Although intense, widespread strain had been 
experienced by the Korean people for years prior to 1945, no known CAH violations were 
committed. One explanation might be that CAH under Japanese imperialism were never 
recorded or reported. This is probable considering that CAH were not even defined until 
after World War II.  
Following World War II, international tensions remained high with the emergence 
of the Cold War. In an attempt to avoid providing either the USSR or the US with complete 
influence over Korea, the country was divided. Charged with overseeing Korean elections, 
President Roosevelt and Russian President Joseph Stalin agreed upon a trusteeship2 plan 
for Korea (G.-D. Kim, 1990). Korea was divided geographically at the 38th parallel, 
forming North and South Korea. North Korea was heavily influenced by the USSR and 
China, while South Korea was influenced by the US and the UN (Lankov, 1960; Millett, 
2001; Rudolph, 1959). As a result, in the coming years these new nations would be further 
divided by ideology. On another level, the division of Korea was a deep source of strain 
for many individuals across the nation. Many families were physically separated by the 
division and Cold War tensions impeded travel and communication across the 38th parallel 
(Foley, 2003; Paik, 1995).  
                                                            
2 The International Trusteeship System was established in Chapter XII of the UN Charter. The program was 
used as a mechanism to provide supervision for territories that were detached from “enemy states” as a 
result of World War II (U.N., 1945, p. 15) 
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The nature of the Cold War exaggerated the value of international influence. 
Therefore, following the establishment of trusteeship, North and South Korea became 
pawns in the Cold War between the US and the USSR (A. Kim, 1970; Millett, 2001; 
Rudolph, 1959; Yang, 1980). The Soviets hoped to maintain and spread Communism 
further throughout Asia while the US hoped to gain Asian allies in order to contain 
Communism. Although despite their place in the middle of the Cold War, between 1945 
and 1950, NK experienced a period of political and economic stability. However, North 
Korea’s stability was dependent upon Soviet aid. In fact, Soviet support would play a 
crucial role in the economic stability of North Korea for many years (Chung, 1983; Eugene 
Kim, 1985; Lankov, 1960; Paik, 1995). As scholar Alexander Kim reports, “The total value 
of Soviet economic assistance to North Korea from the beginning of 1946 to the end of 
1950 is estimated at $546,000,000” (1970, p.241). By 1959, Soviet aid was responsible for 
the majority of North Korean industrial production (Armstrong, 2005). Further, the Library 
of Congress estimates that North Korea accepted close to US$4.75 billion in foreign aid 
between 1946 and 1986—with almost 46% of this coming from the USSR (As cited by 
Cumings et al, 1993). Soviet assistance facilitated the vast improvement of NK’s 
socioeconomic situation between 1945 and 1950. In addition, the USSR guided the 
political structure of the North Korean government. Mirroring Soviet political structure, 
the majority of political power in 1950s NK was derived from the controlling political 
party.  
While the trusteeship solution assisted the social reconstruction of NK in many 
ways, it also set the stage for civil unrest in Korea by dividing the country between the two 
philosophies of Communism and Capitalism. The competing ideologies of the USSR and 
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the US made it difficult for the nations to come to any form of agreement concerning 
Korean elections. The failure of the USSR and the US to host Korean elections squashed 
hopes for the reunification of Korea. Moreover, the economic crutch provided by the USSR 
was not enough to quell North Korea’s dissolution of political and social bonds formed 
with the USSR. Thus, on the social level, the blocked goal of reunification on the Korean 
peninsula had important implications for the future of Korean politics.  
Additionally, social level strain created by the numerous blocked reunification 
attempts encouraged the reorganization of primary group affiliations by emphasizing the 
ideological differences between the Soviet objectives and those of the Korean people (A. 
Kim, 1970). This divergence can be illustrated by the political shift experienced in NK 
during the late 1950s. As the Soviet-North Korean bond began to deteriorate, two distinct 
groups emerged among North Korean government officials—one in favor of the USSR’s 
political control in NK and the other in favor of asserting more Korean control in politics 
(Eugene Kim, 1985; Lankov, 1960; Yang, 1980). The Soviets implemented several 
strategies aimed at maintaining control of North Korea. Kim (1970) notes that in an attempt 
to preserve control over the country, the USSR implemented several tactics: (1) they placed 
Soviet-born Koreans (who were also members of the Soviet Communist Party) in key 
positions of the government and military, (2) they ensured that Kim Il-Sung and his 
followers relied on support from these Soviet Koreans to maintain his influence, and (3) 
they ensured that North Korea was dependent on the USSR for economic and military 
assistance. These three core tactics have been recognized by many historians as integral to 
the maintenance of Soviet control in North Korea’s early years (Armstrong, 2005; Eugene 
Kim, 1985; Gills, 1992; Koh, 1970; Suh, 1973). Despite the use of these tactics, Kim Il-
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Sung began to emerge as an independent political favorite (Eugene Kim, 1985; A. Kim, 
1970; Suh, 1973). Kim was already well-known in Korea for his participation in anti-Japan 
guerilla assaults in Manchuria, China during the 1930s, and Kim utilized this political 
popularity to encourage the invasion of South Korea for purposes of reunification (Yang, 
1980). 
The Korean War (1950-1953). The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea 
(with Soviet support) attempted to invade and overtake South Korea with the goal of 
reunification. The Korean War affected NK’s political situation as well as its citizens 
directly. Brannigan & Hardwick recognize war as an easily identifiable conductor of strain 
because of the obvious effects of death and destruction. War also begins the process of 
dividing individuals into groups based on their beliefs. The War took place on the Korean 
home front. Therefore, from 1950-1953, Korean civilians experienced the death and 
destruction of war. American air raids during the War succeeded in demolishing NK’s 
infrastructure (Millett, 2001). Furthermore, the War failed to unite Korea again. By the end 
of the War some Korean families had been separated for more than seven years. 
The Korean War represents the first time in which the interests of the USSR 
considerably differed from the interests of North Korea. As such, the Korean War might 
be considered the catalyst by which the majority of North Koreans began to form new 
primary group affiliations. This sentiment is expressed by Japanese scholar, Kato Hiroshi, 
during his testimony to the Commission. He said:  
The greatest issue from my opinion is that between 1950 and 1953 during the 
Korean War, the North Korean capital was reduced to ashes and the war had killed a total 
of 3 to 4 million people and also caused 10 million families to split up.  I think that is the 
true root cause and the starting point (Hiroshi as cited in Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 2). 
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The Korean War was extremely violent. At one point during the NK occupation of the 
South Korean capital Seoul, around 93,000 South Koreans and 7,000 Japanese were 
abducted and “returned” to North Korea (Hiroshi as cited in Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 2). For 
the USSR and the US, the War no longer made sense economically. An armistice 
agreement between the USSR and the US ended the Korean War in 1953. By the end of 
the War, the socioeconomic situation in NK was severely unstable (Armstrong, 2005; 
Mercer, 2013; Millett, 2001). The USSR’s agreement with the US also ended North 
Korea’s push for reunification. Kim Il-Sung and many of his supporters disagreed with the 
USSR’s decision to abruptly end the Korean War without victory (Gills, 1992; Lankov, 
1960). The abrupt end to the War encouraged a power shift in favor of Kim Il-Sung and, 
as such, remains a major turning point in the history of North Korea.  
By the end of the Korean War in 1953, the international community had just begun 
to consider the development of an international justice system. As a result, there was no 
ICT or any other special court established to investigate the post-War situation in NK. A 
civil war occurring in any country should have been enough to garner international 
attention. Civil war especially exacerbates the likelihood of crimes against humanity 
violations because the parties involved are often within close range of each other allowing 
for more opportunity to commit crime and providing more suitable targets for crime 
(Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003; Maier-Katkin et al., 2009). However, the international 
criminal justice system was ill-equipped at the time to handle Korea’s situation. 
This analysis indicates that intense, widespread strain was experienced in NK for 
many years prior to the takeover of the Kim Il-Sung regime. Examples of social strain 
discussed include imperialism, political instability, economic dependence, blocked 
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reunification efforts, and the destruction of war. Additionally the Korean War produced 
individual strain, such as the separation of family members during the Korean division and 
the emotional impact of the war. After decades of intense strain, any entity that challenged 
the North Korean goals of reunification and independence became an opponent to the State.  
Thus far, the case of North Korea is consistent with the analyses of Brannigan & 
Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin et al (2009). Prior to an outbreak of CAH violations, 
NK experienced a series of events that produced intense, widespread strain which 
“demarcate[d] the opponents and put them into a state of preexisting conflict and/or 
animosity” (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003, p. 118).  North Korea would eventually respond 
to this strain with the formation of new primary group affiliations, structures, and beliefs 
instituted by Kim Il-Sung and his followers. Kim’s new group structure and beliefs gained 
popularity, uniting North Koreans under the common ideology of Korean Nationalism and 
the common goal of a unified Korea. The unique strain experienced by individuals in NK 
in combination with the influence of communism resulted in a population whose values 
coincided with the values of their authority system.  
4.2 PRIMARY GROUP AFFILIATIONS AND SOCIALIZATION 
Primary Group Affiliations. According to the theoretical outline established in 
Figure 2.1, periods of intense, widespread strain will be subsequently followed by the 
deterioration of old social bonds and the emergence of new primary group affiliations. 
Maier-Katkin et al. explicitly states that fear and self-interest are the driving forces behind 
the formation of new primary group affiliations. Moreover, these new group structures 
often rely on an “us versus them” mentality (Maier-Katkin et al., 2009, p. 241).  
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The Korean War wreaked havoc on socioeconomic conditions in North Korea, and 
many prominent North Korean’s blamed post-war conditions on the USSR (Yang, 1980). 
Consequently, the USSR was now viewed as an opponent to North Korean goals creating 
an “us versus them” mentality. This mentality encouraged Kim’s rise to power. Evidence 
for this can be seen in the 1956 restructuring of NK’s leading political party, the Korean 
Worker’s Party (KWP). Kim successfully purged the Party of Soviet supporters and 
secured his internal power base (A. Kim, 1970; Lankov, 1960). Kim began to sever ties 
with Soviet political policies and began to support North Korean “self-reliance” as a means 
of strengthening local industries and assuring access to everyday necessities for the North 
Korean people (Armstrong, 2005). Foreign economic support nevertheless continued to 
play a significant role in the reconstruction of NK. The communist countries of Eastern 
Europe, along with the USSR and China, united to aid in the reconstruction of North Korea 
as a sign of “international socialist solidarity” (Armstrong, 2005, p. 162). North Korea’s 
economic situation improved rapidly as a result of this collective foreign aid. However, 
Kim aimed to wean North Korea from all foreign dependence as soon as the economy 
stabilized. He did so by utilizing Soviet strategy and seizing control over the government, 
the military, and obtaining economic independence (A. Kim, 1970; Suh, 1973).  By the end 
of 1956, Kim Il-Sung was named leader.  
By 1957, Kim’s position in the Party had been solidified. Kim and his supporters 
had successfully completed the collectivization of 98 percent of North Korea’s farm land 
(A. Kim, 1970; Rudolph, 1959). This meant that the KWP had majority control over 
political and territorial decisions. The members of these collectives were also educated on 
the ideals and values of communism. Kim recognized the importance of educating all North 
42 
 
Korean people on communist ideals and often acknowledge the threat posed by remaining 
support for Japanese imperialist and capitalist philosophies (Yang, 1980). Much of North 
Korea’s foreign policy between 1956 and 1960 promoted independence. This is most 
apparent in the policy of juche (self-reliance) adopted by Kim. In the mid-1960s, “self-
reliance” became the official policy of the North Korean government (Armstrong, 2005; 
Yang, 1980).  
The situations highlighted above are important turning points in the history of North 
Korea. The realignment of political power within the government represents the clear 
formation of new primary group affiliations. Additionally, the collectivization of farmland 
served to broaden the scope of the new group affiliations beyond a political reformation. 
The collectivization of farmland increased the size of the group. The theoretical outline 
notes that periods of intense strain will result in the assembly of people with similar beliefs. 
In the case of NK, the collectivization of farmland illustrates this process.  
Primary Group Socialization. Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) defines primary group 
socialization as the normal process by which individuals assimilate into groups. Drawing 
from self-control theory, Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) suggest that the creation of new 
primary groups allows for individuals to affiliate with “persons of similar dispositions” 
thus, encouraging the socialization process. Moreover, the fear caused by intense, 
widespread strain encourages the socialization of newly formed groups. Additionally, in 
the North Korean case, this fear was exacerbated and encouraged by the “us versus them” 
mentality established by the nationalism and “self-reliance” policies of Kim Il-Sung. The 
Kim Il-Sung regime utilized the philosophies of nationalism and “self-reliance” in order to 
facilitate the dispersion of fear. Evidence for this is seen in the communist education 
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program that took place during the collectivization of farmland. Fear played a significant 
role in the mobilization and dispersion of non-conventional values in NK—with no other 
legitimate political entity to turn to, individuals were more likely to conform in order to 
protect themselves from violence and dehumanization at the hands of the state. For 
example, as Yoo Young Bok recalls of his time as a prisoner of war in 1953: 
…There was a lot of peer pressure. And those who stood up against the North 
Koreans were publicly executed and were secretly transported. I learned later that they 
were taken to the political prison camps. So most of us decided to keep quiet, because we 
knew, if we complained, that we would only be victimized further (Kirby, Biserko, & 
Darusman, 2013h, p. 4). 
Other interviewees express similar sentiments. Former prisoner Mr. Kim Hyuk recalls: 
 At that time in North Korea, we couldn’t say all the things that we wanted to say 
because everyone knew we couldn’t talk about Kim Il-sung…whenever you say the name 
of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-Il, you would have to say it in a very honorific way. So you 
just couldn’t complain; you just could not, you know, resist (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 
2013f, pp. 53–54) 
Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) argue that when the state becomes associated with 
the use of violence and dehumanization, its role as a provider of individual security 
diminishes. Maier-Katkin (2009) asserts that after the establishment of new primary group 
affiliations, “the normal group processes socialization and conformity… will be the 
principal mechanisms by which individuals are brought to participate in crimes against 
humanity” (p.239). However in North Korea, fear, driven by the philosophies of 
nationalism and “self-reliance” expedited the process of conformity. More than 
conformity, these concepts required obedience because if an individual disagreed with the 
authority system, they were subjected to severe persecution. The theoretical outlines 
dictates that structured groups who value obedience legitimize actions taken by the group, 
clouding culpability.  
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In some cases, as illustrated by the testimony of Bok and Hyuk, interviewees 
expressed a perceived inability to disagree with the ruling authority in NK. In other cases, 
individuals decided on conformity in order to protect their own quality of life. For instance, 
North Korean soldier’s basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothing, were provided by 
the government. In order to maintain these basic necessities many soldiers did what they 
were told. Former North Korean military informant, Mr. Choi Joong Hwa reports: 
It’s not that I wanted to become an informant, it’s just that when that was suggested, 
if I had refused I would not have been able to survive in North Korea. You could not refuse 
what they, what you were asked (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013a, p. 7).  
Due to its unique social context, the process of socialization is so closely tied to primary 
group beliefs that this concept will be discussed further in the next section.  
4.3 PRIMARY GROUP STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 
 Maier-Katkin acknowledges that the propositions proposed in their article are 
sequential, meaning that a “sequence of events must unfold” in order to produce crimes 
against humanity. However, the case of NK differs slightly from the outline in Figure 2.1. 
One explanation for this may be the influence of communism. Kim Il-Sung structured the 
NK government in a manner that reflected Joseph Stalin’s vision of communism (Suh, 
1973; Yang, 1980). The communist system encourages individual ideology to follow and 
adhere to the ideology of the state—the concept of nationalism is commonly used to 
encourage adherence to newly established primary group structures (Scalapino, 1977).  
By 1958, Kim Il-Sung became a household name and the most powerful individual 
in NK (Rudolph, 1959). Kim Il-Sung’s beliefs had spread throughout the KWP and were 
infused into the North Korean society. Former North Korean citizen Kim Young Soon says: 
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…In North Korea, there are 10 principles and we are not to damage the reputation and we 
are only to live in loyalty to Kim Il-sung and his family. That is the principle 1. And we 
only had loyalty for these great leaders, and the Labor Party. And only the great leader 
would be responsible for the life of the people of North Korea. That is why I had such 
allegiance and loyalty to the Kim family (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 4).    
She also explains that many North Korean citizens were “brainwashed to live happy under 
the regime” (Kim Young Soon as cited by Kirby et al., 2013a, p. 13). The ideals of juche, 
communism, and nationalism were used to justify and encourage obedience to the Kim 
family and the KWP. Political prisoner Mr. Kang Chol Hwan explains: 
 My grandmother was a hard-core communist… But when her husband was taken 
away to the political camp and when all of us, her kids, were sent to the political camp, 
that’s when she began to have regrets. The communism that she believed in, and the reality 
of the communism, there was a huge gap in the ideal communism. Everybody fared well, 
whereas in North Korea, in the communist North, everything was about upholding and 
protecting the Kim Il-Sung family and Kim Il-Sung. That was not a communist society; it 
was a pseudo-communist society. So my grandmother thought that she had made the wrong 
choice and because of that, she felt that she had put the family into this ordeal (Kirby, 
Biserko, & Darusman, 2013j, p. 61) 
These quotes illustrate the influence of group structure on individual’s group affiliations in 
NK, in some cases giving them no choice or “brainwashing” them to subscribe to the 
primary group affiliations preferred by the authority. In fact, Kim Hwan testified that many 
high ranking officials have been to the “revolutionary” zone Yodok where re-education is 
said to take place. Additionally, several former North Korean soldiers testified that they 
also received ideology training. While few former soldiers were interviewed, each echoed 
the same sentiment concerning ideology education. For example, Kim Joo-Il recounts his 
training as a soldier, stating:  
Starting from nine o'clock for about two hours the soldiers were given education 
about idolizing Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il.  And then they were given education about 
political awareness as well.  This was part of the military training but those soldiers who 
were stationed near the DMZ (De-Militarization Zone) area… the problem was that they 
would - the soldiers would find balloons that had been planted or that had been dropped by 
the South Korean government and in those they would find radios, rice or some candy.  
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Then the North Korean government will brainwash the soldiers saying if you eat any of 
these goods that the South Korean's dropped in their balloons, your flesh will start to rot.  
And that's what's contained in the indoctrination training - that kind of brainwashing 
(Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013b, p. 9). 
This ideological training also occurred in other conventional institutions across NK 
like school and work. One witness, referred to as Mrs. L, testifies about her experience as 
a college student in NK. She notes that in her sophomore year of college she was forced to 
spend the majority of her study time practicing a dance that was to be performed in front 
of Kim Jong-Il. The purpose of this dance was understood as a test and show of loyalty to 
the Kim family and the Party. She recalls: 
Most people didn’t want to participate, so they reluctantly participated, but to the 
supervisors, we could not say we were reluctant.  We could not say no, but they would be 
talking among themselves saying that they are not that willing to do it. It was a hard practice 
for about a year, so during hot summer days as well as cold days. Of course, nobody would 
really want to do that (Kirby et al., 2013l, p. 36). 
This dance performance is similar to the event held each year known as the Mass Games. 
Although Mrs. L never participated in the Games she did attest to knowledge of the Games, 
specifically, the well-known story of an 8 year old boy who died because he continued to 
practice the dance although he had appendicitis. Mrs. L explains that this story was 
celebrated in NK; the little boy became a hero because he “dedicate[d] his life to this event” 
(Kirby et al., 2013l, p. 38). This memory illustrates exactly how far the juche ideology had 
been absorbed by the “ordinary” members of society. In NK, the death of this 8 year-old 
boy incited feelings of nationalism and further encouraged acceptance of Kim Il-Sung’s 
philosophies. Moreover, allegiance to the Kim family and the KWP, as well as juche 
ideology was so interwoven into NK society that several of the NK interviewees reported 
that they did not even know of the concept “human rights” until they escaped the country 
(Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013a; Kirby et al., 2013e).  
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Another interviewee, Jihyun Park, also testifies that schooling was commonly 
interrupted in order to perform other tasks that honored the Kim family and demonstrated 
solidarity for the Party. Park explains,  
In the schools we don’t just study. In addition to studying we were supposed to clean the 
school over the breaks we would clean the school again and after the school we used to 
provide our [labours] to the farms nearby (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013b, pp. 3–4). 
Obedience to Kim and to the Party was valued above education and in some cases the lives 
of individuals. Maier-Katkin’s theoretical organization suggests that group structure will 
determine authority and law systems; however, in the case of NK this process appears 
reversed. That is, the authority and legal system required specific group structures and 
social roles. Thus, the type of group structure developed under the influence of the 
authority provides a false sense of legitimacy to any actions taken by the group. In order to 
preserve their quality of life many individuals either willingly or under pressure into 
adopted values of violence and dehumanization. As previously discussed, this concept has 
been noted in other contexts, most notably Zimbardo’s Prison Experiment (1971). Mrs. L 
explains that North Korean people do not riot or revolt because they fear that their entire 
family will be punished (Kirby et al., 2013e). Kang Chol-Hwan explained this describing 
how in NK, “you are guilty, there is guilt by association. So, if your father does something 
wrong, the sons, as well as the grandchildren, are punished as well” (Kirby et al., 2013j, p. 
60). This fear is perpetuated by the structure as well as the dynamics of the group and are 
further encouraged by the belief system. 
4.4 PRIMARY GROUP BELIEF SYSTEMS 
The socialization of primary group beliefs in NK can be attributed to several 
factors: (1) forced ideology training in conventional institutions, “revolutionary districts,” 
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and prison camps, (2) the degree of obedience required by the group structure/dynamics, 
and (3) the control and limitation of information by Kim and the KWP. These tactics 
artificially united the North Korean leaders and people against outside forces and 
encouraged the values of nationalism and “self-reliance” at all costs. 
In the North Korean case, primary group affiliations rooted heavily in communist 
ideals required a specific group structure in which the majority of power belonged to Kim 
Il-Sung and other high ranking party officials. As such, the socialization and conformity 
process was largely driven by Party policies and the guiding philosophies of Kim Il-Sung. 
Kim’s nationalism and juche philosophies engulfed NK in the 1950s and remain an integral 
part of the guiding belief system in the country today. Several interviewees from different 
decades illustrate the strategies by which these philosophies were infused into North 
Korean politics and everyday social life.  
Forced Relocations. Multiple COI witnesses addressed the forcible transfer of a 
large population of Japanese-Koreans. Japanese journalist Ishidaka Kenji testified that 
during the Korean War, the North Korean government coerced or forced approximately 
93,000 South Koreans and 7,000 Japanese Koreans to return to NK (Kirby, Biserko, & 
Darusman, 2013k). Korean ethnics living in Japan were encouraged to bring their wealth 
back to NK so that they could contribute to NK society. In some cases, “they [the NK 
authority] forced the families to abduct other people so that they can [guarantee] the safety 
of their family in North Korea” (Ishidaka Kenji as cited by Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 
2013i, p. 4). 
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In other cases, propaganda was used to coerce the return of Koreans and others 
living abroad. For example, Saito Hiroko, the Japanese wife of an ethnic Korean man, 
relocated with her husband to NK with the understanding that NK would be like a paradise. 
However, Mrs. Hiroko attests that NK was more like “hell on earth” (Kirby et al., 2013m, 
p. 12). She described NK using a metaphor, comparing the country to the apartments of the 
capital, Pyongyang, which she saw upon her arrival: 
There is a frontal side and back side in the reality of North Korea.  Frontal view of 
the apartment; you may think that this apartment is beautiful, beautifully decorated by tiles 
and so forth, and that is the building in Pyongyang, but if you go back to the back of that 
apartment, then you can see dark and dirty apartment (Kirby et al., 2013m, p. 12). 
In order to maintain the “paradise on earth” image, North Korean authorities also 
monitored communication to and from Japan. Still, some Japanese “returnees” found 
creative ways to communicate with their families in Japan. Figure 4.1 shows an encoded 
message written on the back of a stamp. Interviewees testify that letters sent to Japan were 
reviewed before they were mailed, however, this secret message was able to go undetected 
  
Figure 4.1 Secret Message3 
                                                            
3 Image provided by Mr. Yamada Fumiaki at the Tokyo Public Hearing, 30 August 2013, morning.  
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and warned of the situation in NK. The message reads: “We cannot leave the village. Older 
brother do not come. Mother says she wishes to see you. Tell our sister in Toyama also not 
to come. What Bunto’s father said is correct” (UNGA, 2014, pp. 293–294). 
After the forced migrants served their purpose to NK, they were cast aside, many 
of them treated as criminals (Kirby et al., 2013m). One interviewee, Professor Yamada 
Fumiaki talks about a period called Magyabi, which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. 
During this time, many people disappeared, even if they had not necessarily committed a 
crime. Also during this time, the use of Japanese language was deemed illegal in NK. Even 
outsiders who had once served a purpose in NK were no longer welcome and deemed a 
threat to the juche philosophy (Kirby et al., 2013m). 
Forced Ideology Training. In NK, because the group structure demands 
obedience, prisoners are viewed as traitors to the Kim family and the Party and as such, 
they are “re-educated” to perform the social roles expected of them. As discussed above, 
many former interviewees noted that they were subjected to re-education and forced 
ideology training in conventional settings.  However some cases occurred in specialized 
re-education prisons known as “revolutionary districts” (Kang Chol Hwan as cited in 
Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013c, p. 54). Revolutionary zones are considered NK’s 
ordinary prison camps (Kyo-Hwa-So) where prisoners with shorter sentences are held with 
the main goal of rehabilitation. On the other hand, political prison camps were institutions 




According to Ms. Kim Young Soon, after the War, citizens who openly opposed 
the Kim regime were sent to prison camps. Her testimony discloses that during her time in 
the prison camp she witnessed a wide range of prisoners enter the camp—from high level 
supervisors to soccer players to eye doctors. However, it has been difficult to pinpoint the 
exact time in which these camps were formed—from the transcripts released by the UN 
the earliest reported use of NK prison camps comes from the testimony of Ms. Soon who 
was imprisoned in Yodok camp in 1970 (Kirby et al., 2013a).  
The interviewees’ responses indicate that both prisoners of the “revolutionary 
districts” and of the political prisons (Kwan-Li-So) were subjected to ideology training 
sessions. In the prison camps, they are taught that the Kim family is the brain of NK and 
the nationalists who support him make up the arms, hands, and legs of the body (Kirby et 
al., 2013d). In the early 1950s, Yamada Fumiaki spent several years in NK against his will 
as a member of the 7,000 Japanese “returned” to North Korea. He explains the concept of 
juche, noting that in NK, “…the brain is Kim Il-Sung and you must work for him, you must 
follow his idea” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013l, p. 10). Hence, juche dictates that all 
productive members of NK society must work to achieve the ideas of Kim Il-Sung. In 
North Korea, if one person is not fulfilling their social role then the whole system suffers; 
therefore it is in the best interest of all group members to ensure full participation in and 
acceptance of Kim Il-Sung and the Party’s values.  
Violence is utilized to reinforce the values of obedience and nationalism. Kang 
Chol-Hwan was taken to Yodok revolutionary camp when he was 9 years old because his 
father was found to be a traitor.  Mr. Hwan testifies that labor in these camps is less intense 
and prisoners enjoy a less controlled environment. However, “when it came to the torture… 
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and when it came to the executions, it was almost the same” (Kang Chol-Hwan as cited in 
Kirby et al., 2013c, p. 56). The use of torture in State run prison camps highlights the 
priorities of the North Korean belief system, sending the message that the use of violence 
is an acceptable means of achieving obedience. While the use of violence within the prison 
camps was known by North Korea’s citizens, sanctioned acts of violence rarely occurred 
outside the walls of the prison camps. Instead, the threat of imprisonment was used to 
encourage obedience and dispersion of Party beliefs to North Korean citizens. For example, 
a former follower of the “self-reliance” philosophy, Kim Young Hwan recalls, “…With 
just a slip of [the] tongue, you could be sent to a political prison camp (Kwan-Li-So)” 
(Kirby et al., 2013j, p. 4). One reason that physical violence is limited to the prison camps 
may be in order to maintain legitimacy of the authority and law systems. 
 Also, the limitation of information is commonly utilized by the NK government as 
a way to maintain primary group beliefs. Kim and the Party control many social institutions 
in NK responsible for the distribution of information and as such are able to control what 
information is dispersed. Moreover, since gaining autonomy in 1959, the leaders of NK 
have been slowly implementing several measures aimed at isolating NK from the rest of 
the world. For example, in the early 1960s NK criminalized the ownership of tunable 
radios—only fixed-station radios were available for purchase in NK (Lankov, 1960). 
Additionally, NK’s law limits individuals’ freedom of movement, which prevents them 
from leaving the country and even monitors their movement within the country. Dr. Cho 
Jung Hyun of the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU), a South Korean policy 
institute, says, “They [North Korea] have adopted the travel permit system, which means 
that you need a special permit to leave your neighbourhood and go to another place” (Hyun 
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as cited by Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 42). This isolation may have contributed to individual 
level acceptance of group beliefs. Another explanation for the acceptance of these group 
beliefs may be that there have been or are few legitimate alternatives. In some case, 
freedom of movement limitations triggered resistance among North Korean citizens. 
However, individuals who broke these laws were oftentimes arrested. As a result, many 
North Korean citizens respected these limitations in order to serve their own self-interests 
of stay out of prison.  
Maier-Katkin et al. conclude that in environments “dominated by strain, 
physiological arousal, and fear” belief systems will be easily influenced by an individual’s 
self-interest. There is evidence for this proposition in the NK case. The decades of strain 
instilled widespread personal insecurity and fear among North Koreans. As a result, new 
primary group affiliations were created and structured around the ideals of communism 
and the philosophies of Kim Il-Sung. Once he was in control of the Party, Kim Il-Sung 
used his position of power to implement policies that terrorized the population and limited 
the dispersion of information, leaving many citizens with one viable option—to accept the 
group’s beliefs and accept their social roles as assigned by the authority. 
4.4 DISPLACEMENT OF AGGRESSION 
Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) explain the important role that group structure and 
authority play in mobilizing and creating opportunities for perpetrators of CAH. My review 
of the North Korean belief system shows strong evidence that policies and philosophies of 
the NK authority created several opportunities for individuals to displace their aggression. 
As reviewed above, several interviewees have referred to the prison camps of North Korea 
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and described the violence that occurs within these prisons. The testimonies suggest that 
the Kim family and the KWP utilize these political prison camps as a means of encouraging 
obedience. The testimony given to the UN suggests that prison camps are central places 
where violence is perpetuated.  
All of the interviewees who had experienced the prison camps firsthand reported 
being forcibly taken to special housing by Bowibu, the NK National Security Agency. It 
was only after they reached the Bowibu investigation facility that the use of violence 
occurred. In some cases, the Bowibu would hold and torture prisoners for as long as 6 
months in order to coerce a confession (Kim Eun Cheol as cited by Kirby et al., 2013c). 
However, torture was not limited to the Bowibu facilities, as torture continued within the 
political prisons themselves. Although the existence of prison camps are widely denied by 
the NK government, the presence of political prison camps is well known by the general 
population of NK (UNGA, 2014). A map created by the UN shown in Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the approximate location of “revolutionary districts” and political prison camps. The map 
was drawn based on the testimony received by the UN’s Commission of Inquiry.  
Formerly a homeless child in NK, Mr. Kim Hyuk was sentenced to 3 years in one 
of NK’s “revolutionary districts” for the crime of leaving the country in search of food. His 
testimony reveals that prison camps are well known to the general population of NK and 
the North Korean government uses these camps as a deterrent (Kirby et al., 2013f). 
According to Mr. Hyuk, it is well known in North Korean society that survival was unlikely 
upon relocation to political prison camps. Violence was most prevalent in controlled 
environments like the prisons and Bowibu investigation facilities. One reason, discussed 
above, might be that authority and law system remain legitimate when violence occurs in 
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controlled environments. Another reason may be that violence is only used against those 
who are a perceived or confirmed threat to the goals of the primary group— individuals 
who are concentrated within prison camps in North Korea. 
 Several interviewees reported being tortured during investigation by the Bowibu. 
For example, Mr. Kim Eun Cheol recalls the torture he endured while detained in one of 
NK’s Bowibu investigation facilities: 
Bowibu, once you get caught, you are treated like a dog. I was interrogated and was 
investigated for about 6 months. I was tortured. I was beaten… I was beaten so badly, that 
6 of my teeth, my upper teeth and lower teeth, were broken. And they had me kneeled, so 
my knees are all scratched and hurt (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 23). 
Another former prisoner Mr. Jeong Kwang-Il recalls his arrest and experience with the 
Bowibu:  
 I think it was July 1999, I think it was 9oclock at night. I was sleeping at a friend’s 
house and I was arrested at night. And I was arrested and taken…As soon as I was in the 
room they started beating me…And they said that I should acknowledge, that I should 
confess that I am a spy. But I told them I’m not a spy but they kept beating me. For two 
weeks, I was beaten with clubs and they had what’s called “pigeon of torture” where they 
would hang me upside-down. I kept saying that I’m not a spy…I received pigeon torture 
for ten months. And I was about 75kg before the arrest, but after ten months, I was down 
to 36kg. I could not endure this anymore so I confessed that I was given a spy’s job from 
South Korea. I had given up (Kirby et al., 2013d, pp. 34–35). 
It is reported that torture techniques are taught to members of the Bowibu. Former prison 
guard Mr. Ahn Myong Chul dictates:  
 I mean there is no instruction book. They simply use the torture tools around, and 
they are taught by their seniors or superiors how to do the torture… Their superiors would 
tell them or the seniors would tell them which spot would hurt the most. Bowibu would be 
responsible for the torture (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 22). 
Once a prisoner has been relocated to the prison, their interaction with the Bowibu 




Figure 4.2 United Nations Map of Prison Camps4 
                                                            
4Map produced by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, January 28, 2014. 
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executions and torture, day to day interaction with the Bowibu is limited within the 
confines of the prison. Prison guards were responsible for the oversight of prison labor and 
punishment. Although prison guards are considered part of the military, their training is 
different. Mr. Chul informed the COI about his guard training experience: 
Well, the political prison guards... the kind of training that we received the most is 
related to ideology, so we are trained and educated about the allegiance and loyalty to Kim 
Il-Sung. We actually receive two hours more than the military. About 60 percent of the 
training was about the ideology, and the rest was about physical training and about how to 
oppress the riots. So, we had very intensive ideology training for six months, and that 
training is to… I guess invoke hostility against the inmates and to imprint in our minds that 
the inmates are enemies… So they would have like a lecture material. The training material 
is confidential, so we have different ideology training than the ordinary military, so we 
would write down. We would memorize the instructions, the orders from Kim Il-Sung and 
Kim Jung-Il (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 19). 
The political prison camps are used by the NK government to house a wide array 
of offenders. Some were imprisoned for knowing too much about the Kim family and its 
relatives, while other were sent to these camps as punishment for crimes like theft of food, 
attempting to escape NK, and interaction with South Koreans ( Kim Young Soon, Kim Eun 
Cheol, and Jeong Kwang-Il as cited by Kirby et al., 2013e). This was a red flag for the 
COI. All of the interviewees reported their reasons for being taken to these political prison 
camps, however, many of these transgressions were not recognized by the international 
community as a justifiable means for imprisonment (UNGA, 2014). Additionally, a certain 
level of due process is expected. Former prisoner Mr. Kim Kwang-Il talks about the lack 
of due process in NK: 
Well, in North Korea, by law, you are supposed to be given an arrest warrant but 
you are never given an arrest warrant in North Korea. They just arrest you. And by the law 
of North Korea, they need to have a case in order to be able to detain you and you need a 
time period of investigation to find out whether you have actually violated the law or not. 
But, without all of this due diligence I was arrested, without due process of law I was 
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arrested. There was no legal process taken to verify whether I had actually violated any 
law or not. I was detained right away (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013i, p. 5).  
It appears that despite North Korean laws put in place to protect its citizen’s right to due 
process, violations of individual rights occur on a widespread basis. Oftentimes, political 
prisoners in NK are held for excessive periods of time without ever being informed of the 
reason for their detention. Former North Korean guard Mr. Ahn Myong Chul testifies that 
many people were imprisoned without warning, cause, or even trial. He states:  
Ninety percent of people there (Kaechon prison) had no idea why they were in the 
camps. They all told me that one night when they were in bed, suddenly Bowibu people 
came to their house and they got arrested, and sometimes they told [me] that they were 
being punished for a crime that [was] committed by someone they knew (Kirby et al., 
2013d, p. 11). 
Mr. Shin Dong Hyuk was born inside of one of NK’s prisons, the reason his mother had 
been arrested was unknown to him: 
 I don’t know exact details as to why my Mom came to be in the camp…it may not 
be 100% accurate, but from what I understand my father’s relatives…I think the older 
brother (father’s brother) went to South Korea, so that’s what I understand, that’s what I 
heard when I was younger. And, that’s not 100% accurate but that’s what I know (Kirby, 
Biserko, & Darusman, 2013c, p. 6). 
One explanation for this may be NK’s “guilt by association” policy which encourages the 
punishment of the alleged criminal as well as three generations of his family. The UN views 
this policy as a state sponsored policy endorsing extermination of possible political 
opponents. This is evidence of a national policy put in place to encourage the individual 
level displacement of aggression.  
 Furthermore, Mr. Shin Dong Hyuk’s experience highlights that pregnant women 
and infants are not shown sympathy and are not pardoned from abuse in NK’s prison 
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camps. Other interviewees also testified to violence against pregnant women and children. 
Mr. Chul recalls: 
The leader of my platoon or my team battalion was Han Dae Chul. He raped one of 
the inmates and the woman actually got pregnant and gave birth to a baby in the field. The 
baby and the woman they were taken to detention houses. And they were trying to find out 
who the father was. The inmate said that she was raped by one of the soldiers, [then] the 
baby was put into a pot where the meal was made for military dogs (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 
8). 
The treatment of pregnant women and infants was also addressed by anonymous 
interviewees. Ms. P. testified, “Three pregnant women were hit in the stomach. Newborns 
who were born there starved to death” (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 29). Prison guard’s 
indiscriminate use of violence suggests that prisoners were viewed as less than human. 
Further, this level of violence against all prisoners suggests that North Korea’s political 
prison camps are used as a means to control and exterminate large numbers of people.  
Extermination can be achieved through several tactics that include “withholding of 
necessities of life” and “the imposition of living arrangements that would knowingly lead 
to mass deaths” (UNGA, 2014, p. 324). Basically, the living conditions of the prison camps 
were intended to result in the death of the majority of the prison population. This is best 
illustrated through the testimony of former prison guard of Kaechon, Mr. Ahn Myong Chul. 
His statements highlighted above have shed light on the inner workings of North Korea’s 
prison camps as well as the training and ideology of the prison guards. Additionally, he 
testifies that prison guards are taught that prisoners are not supposed to survive camp. 
Explaining the ideology, he says guards are taught to believe that they should be violent 
with prisoners. He elaborates, “We should attack them. We really don’t care if we are going 
to kill them or let them live” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013f, p. 6).  
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Figure 4.3 illustrates some types of torture utilized by prison guards in NK. The 
first two drawings known as “pigeon and motorcycle” torture, were created based on the 
experiences of former prisoners. The third drawing depicts “coffin” torture and was drawn 
while the torture was occurring. Prisoner Jeong Kwang-Il testified to being a victim of 
pigeon torture. He describes this torture for the COI: 
This pigeon torture, so you are hand-cuffed behind your back and then they hang 
you so that you would not be able to stand or sit and you would look like pigeon, the pigeon 
with their chest pushed out; you would sort of look like a pigeon. I saw this book about 
torture and I understand that torture was conducted during the colonial times and in North 
Korea, the criminals are kept at the detention houses and the detention houses are in North 
Korea are copied after the detention houses that were built during the Japanese colonial 
rule (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 34). 
Other prisoners also report being punished with these types of specialized torture. Mr. Kim 
Kwang-Il describes the “motorcycle” torture he endured:  
 At the detention center, we are on our knees and there is a glass and we are supposed 
to be in the same position until the glass is filled. We are supposed to think there’s an 
imaginary motorcycle and we are supposed to be in this position as if we are riding the 
motorcycle. And for this, we pose as if we are airplanes ourselves. We are flying. And if 
we stand like this there’s no way that you can hold that position for a long time. You are 
bound to fall forward. Everybody in the detention center goes through this kind of this 
torture (Kirby et al., 2013i, p. 11). 
The final drawing depicting “coffin” torture is also described by Mr. Kim Kwang-Il. 
Guards would force prisoners into coffin-like confinement sometimes for days (Kirby et 
al., 2013i). However, abuse in the prison camps is not limited to physical torture. What’s 
more, in his testimony Korean scholar Dr. Lee Geum Soon acknowledges that many 
inmates commit CAH against other inmates in order to survive or simply out of fear (Kirby 
et al., 2013e). Emotional abuse is also prevalent within the camps. All of the interviewees 
that had experienced prison life acknowledged that they witnessed executions during their 




Figure 4.3 Torture Drawings5 
                                                            
5 Drawings by Kwon Hyo Jin, presented to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry by Kim Kwang-Il on 
August 28, 2013. 
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For example, former Yodok prisoner, Mr. Kim Eun Cheol witnessed two executions during 
his year at the camp between 2002 and 2003. According to Mr. Cheol, both inmates were 
executed for stealing food (Kirby et al., 2013d, pp. 29–30). As part of the execution process, 
these inmates were sent to solitary confinement. Recalling the executions that he witnessed 
Mr. Cheol states that when prisoners were transferred to the execution sites, “You could 
see that they were already on the verge of dying” (Kirby et al., 2013d, p. 30).  Moreover, 
Mr. Cheol attests that his brother was executed for attempting to escape to South Korea, 
acknowledging that the execution for this offense was commonplace. Additionally, these 
executions were performed in front of prisoners of all ages, for example, Mr. Kim Hyuk 
witnessed his first execution at age 9 (Kirby et al., 2013d). 
However, not all executions were sanction by NK policies. While public executions 
were used in some cases, it was more common for the prisoners to die as a result of the 
conditions of the prison. Moreover, some deaths were caused by overzealous guards. Mr. 
Ahn Myong Chul addresses this issue during his testimony recalling that fellow guard, 
Kang Young Chul, engaged in the killing of prisoners for “no reason.” Furthermore, he 
mentions that officials were made aware of these killings, but no punishment was assigned 
to Kang Young Chul because he “killed out of allegiance to the Bowibu” (Kirby et al., 
2013e, p. 4). The concept of “ordinary” people becoming perpetrators of CAH is discussed 
by both Brannigan & Hardwick (2003) and Maier-Katkin (2009). In environments like 
NK’s prison camps, strain, group affiliations, and group structure has influenced the values 
and beliefs accepted by large populations. In the case of NK, people who were once 
everyday citizens now value obedience and use violence against a dehumanized population 
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in order to achieve it. As such, the guards do not feel as if they are acting “overzealously”— 
instead they are abiding by the laws of their society, albeit a non-conventional society.  
While torture and violence account for many deaths within the North Korean prison 
camps, many deaths can also be attributed to inadequate access to food, forced labor, and 
diseased living conditions in North Korean prison camps. Although most prisoners 
interviewed did report that they were fed three meals a day, all former prisoners agree that 
the rations provided were not enough to survive comfortably. For example, anonymous 
interviewee Ms. P reported that:  
We were given corn rice, corn based food, just enough to keep us alive. Young 
male inmates for example, it was very insufficient, so male inmates would find worms or 
snakes in the field when they were working there. They would eat them alive to feel that 
feeling in the stomach. The food was never enough, and that’s how they got by (Kirby et 
al., 2013e, p. 30). 
While there are certainly many instances of systematic violence equivalent to CAH being 
committed within North Korea’s prison camps, the COI concluded that the deplorable 
conditions of the prison camps themselves constitute a “widespread and systematic” attack 
pursuant to State policies. Furthermore, these prisons provide a secure place for guards to 
commit violent acts against North Korean citizens. The COI noted that “in some cases, the 
Commission was able to trace orders to cause the disappearance of individuals to the camps 
to the level of the Supreme Leader” (UNGA, 2014, p. 330). 
The testimony of NK defectors has provided evidence of violent crimes committed 
against the prison population and the general population of North Korea. International laws 
established by the Nuremburg trials deem these violations as crimes against humanity. 
Interviews conducted by the UN’s COI provide important insights as to the intent of 
policies encouraged by the Kim family and the Party, and first-hand accounts of the quality 
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of life in NK. Interviewees were able to identify violent and dehumanizing values 
propagated by the Kim family and the KWP. A few examples include the use of prison 
camps, the limitation of movement and information, the use of forceful abductions to gain 
labor skills and increase the wealth of NK, forced ideology education, and the exacerbation 
of the starvation epidemic. The actual perpetrators of crime in North Korea are often 
“ordinary” citizens who have accepted the role of “prison guard” or “Bowibu” assigned to 
them by the Kim family regime and the KWP. The Kim family regime and the KWP have 
created a primary group system in which obedience is valued above all else. Prison camps 
in North Korea offer an avenue in which anger can be directed towards unguarded targets 
and further provides individuals with a sense of legitimacy regarding their actions.  
4.6 A TURNING OF THE TIDE? 
During the mid-1980s, the North Korean leadership made an effort to establish ties 
with the outside world. This was, in part, due to the transfer of power from Kim Il-Sung to 
his son, Kim Jung-Il (Shinn, 1983). However, continued setbacks in Korean reunification 
occurred as a result of a violent outbreak known as the Rangoon Bombing that killed 17 
South Korean officials in 1983. Unfortunately, North Korea’s involvement in this incident 
also led to the severance of diplomatic relations with Burma, Comora, Costa Rica, Japan, 
and Western Samoa (Kihl, 1985). Additionally, during this coming out period, North Korea 
attempted to establish relations with the United States, even going so far as to invite US 
congressmen to visit the country (Kihl, 1985; Mercer, 2013). It remains possible that the 
extension of this olive brank to the US was propaganda although other scenarios suggest 
that the North Korean commitment to rebuilding its image was existent. This was most 
apparent in their humanitarian aid efforts following a devastating flood in South Korea— 
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the North Korean Red Cross Society provided aid in the form of cement, rice, and textiles 
(Kihl, 1985). However, these humanitarian efforts were halted during the 1990s when 
famine struck North Korea. 
Famine in the 1990s. During the 1990s famine struck NK. These problems were 
exacerbated by NK officials who hoarded food for themselves and for the troops (Aaltola, 
1999). The famine stemmed from a variety of factors, all of which cannot be attributed to 
the NK government or its policies. For North Korea, the 1990s brought about the 
withdrawal of Soviet economic support, a series of floods and droughts, as well as the 
transfer of power in NK from Kim Il-Sung to his son Kim Jong-Il (H. Kim, 2003).  
Nonetheless, the famine illustrated the inability and unwillingness of the North Korean 
government to handle large scale disaster in NK.  
UN foreign aid was provided to NK in the form of food; however, the North Korean 
government used the food as leverage to encourage obedience amongst citizens and 
soldiers (Jiro a cited by Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013).  As a result, the NK people 
were able to retake some power from the authority with the creation of stable market 
systems. Additionally, Mr. Ishamiru Jiro contends that the problem in NK is the 
population’s access to food as opposed to a food shortage. As a result, the famine 
encouraged the growth of black markets for the sale of food. These black markets were not 
contested by the North Korean government because they simply did not have the ability to 
provide for all citizens. Jiro says, “…From what I observed, 70-80% of people now gain 
food by buying food using their cash in these kinds of market, so they don’t rely on the 
food ration from the government” (Kirby, Biserko, & Darusman, 2013, p. 24). Although 
the army accounted for 5% of the population with about 1.2 million soldiers registered, the 
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NK authority was unable to supply food to all of its soldiers (H. Kim, 2003).  Moreover, 
NK soldiers had limited access to the newly established black markets because the 
government provides “food in exchange for obedience” (Jiro as cited by Kirby et al., 2013, 
p. 27). Although 0.7 million tons of foreign food aid has been donated to NK, even from 
the United States, starvation continues to be a problem in NK (Aaltola, 1999). However, 
Jiro notes that since the transfer of power from Kim Jong-Il to his son, Kim Jong-Un, 
policies have encouraged the confiscation of crops from rural farmlands in order to 
maintain healthy troops, consistent with NK’s “military first” policy. This has drastically 
affected the rural populations in NK and as such, Jiro reports that many of these citizens 
maintain a strong desire for change (Kirby et al., 2013j).  
While North Korea has made some attempts at reconnecting with conventional 
society and conventional institutions like the UN, some policies that value violence and 
dehumanization remain in place today, especially in the prison camps of North Korea. 
However, under the son of Kim Jong-Il and current Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, North 
Korea has shown signs of cooperation. Dr. Lee Geum Soon testifies that the number of 
public executions has dropped since 2009 when the transfer of power to Kim Jong-Un 
began (Kirby et al., 2013e, p. 38). Although, quantifiable evidence of a decrease in public 
executions remains unavailable, KINU scholars remain confident that a causal link 
between the decrease and succession of power to Kim Jong-Un exists (Cho et al., 2013). 
Moreover, on October 4, 2014, North Korea agreed to reopen unification talks with South 
Korea. This new openness might signal the dissolution of the Kim family’s control after 
60 years and two successions of power. One thing is clear, since the 1980s, the philosophies 
established by Kim Il-Sung and perpetuated by his lineage have been slowly losing their 
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influence in North Korea. While certain government sponsored policies continue to utilize 
violent and dehumanizing techniques, the overwhelming number of witnesses willing to 
speak out against the Supreme Leader and the Party demonstrates a definite backlash is 




CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
State sponsored crimes against humanity account for a significant number of deaths 
each year. The magnitude of such crime demands attention. To date, there are few entities 
capable of addressing these crimes. While the last several decades have garnered 
responsiveness to international crimes, the laws regarding these crimes remain difficult to 
enforce. The increasing globalization of our society requires that an effective means of 
dealing with CAH perpetrators be established. Theories aid social scientists in the 
understanding of new phenomena and as such, several theories of CAH have been posited 
in recent years. This thesis has discussed and analyzed the theories of Brannigan and 
Hardwick (2003) as well as Maier-Katkin et al (2009) in order to determine how well these 
theories describe and explain CAH in the case of North Korea. This examination was able 
to identify key turning points specific to the North Korean case that help to explain how 
and why CAH occurred.  
Informed by historical analysis and existing theory, this thesis utilized information 
provided by the United Nation’s Commission of Inquiry to determine the progression and 
severity of state perpetrated crimes against humanity in North Korea. On February 17, 2014 
the UN’s COI released a detailed report acknowledging evidence of CAH in North Korea. 
The COI, also released all supporting evidence and documentation including the transcripts 
69 
 
of eye-witnesses and expert testimonies. This evidence was analyzed using the case study 
methods outline by Robert K. Yin (Yin, 2014). 
 There are many advantages to utilizing case study methods, especially in social 
science fields. Case study methods enable researchers to explore contemporary phenomena 
that lack theoretical grounding. Furthermore, case study research helps organize qualitative 
concepts prevalent in complex social situations which facilitates the development of causal 
explanations. Nonetheless, case study work has been criticized for being subjective and 
prone to bias. Additionally, scholars have questioned the validity of generalizations made 
from case study research. Yin rebuts this contention by noting that case studies are 
generalizable to the theory or theories in which they are studying (Yin, 2014, p. 21). 
Furthermore, arguments have been made that these generalizations are just one way of 
gaining knowledge on a subject. Specific limitations of this method in the North Korean 
case include incomplete official record keeping, limited access to the country, and limited 
interviewees willing to testify. However, if any information is gained in the process of 
examining a phenomenon, the research has been a success (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Smeulers & 
Hola, 2009).  
Results. Brannigan & Hardwick and Maier-Katkin et al. have proffered theories 
capable of explaining most aspects of CAH in North Korea. The precursors and conditions 
leading to violations of CAH in NK largely followed the theoretical propositions 
articulated by both perspectives. The theoretical outline dictates that as a precursor to CAH 
violations, intense and widespread strain occurs at the social and individual levels. 
Evidence for this proposition is apparent in the case of NK. Social indicators of strain in 
North Korea include Japanese imperialism, political instability, economic dependence on 
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the USSR, blocked re-unification attempts, and war. Many of these social stressors 
contributed to individual level strain. For example, the political instability of Korea 
following the end of Japanese imperialism resulted in the division of the country, forming 
North and South Korea. Consequently, many families were separated as a result of the 
division, causing individual-level strain. Additionally, the Korean War destroyed much of 
NK’s infrastructure, producing strain as well as fear among the civilian population.  
Following periods of intense, widespread strain in NK, rising levels of fear caused 
individuals to form new primary group affiliations. Evidence for this proposition is mainly 
seen in North Korea’s political shift beginning in 1956. The end of the Korean War 
loosened the bonds between USSR officials and North Korean officials. In 1956, the North 
Korean government formed new group identities and affiliations. Many North Korean 
officials and ordinary citizens blamed the USSR for prematurely ending the Korean War 
and failing to reunite North and South Korea. Thus, an “us versus them” mentality drove 
Kim Il-Sung’s rise to power within the political system and rise to popularity amongst the 
citizens of NK. Kim’s policies of nationalism and juche fueled this mentality and in turn, 
created widespread fear—including most poignantly the fear of being sent to prison camps. 
Additionally, this fear propelled the notion that anyone who opposed Kim also opposed the 
nation. In the case of NK, fear promoted conformity and socialization. At this point the 
case of North Korea begins to diverge from the theoretical outlines of Brannigan & 
Hardwick and Maier-Katkin et al.  
The new group affiliations in North Korea were driven by a political shift. As such, 
one cannot ignore the influence of communism on the group structure and dynamics of 
North Korea. Communist ideology dictates that individual ideology mirror that of the state. 
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Therefore, the political shift in 1956 created new group affiliations and ideology demanded 
socialization and conformity. Furthermore, communist ideology requires a group structure 
in which the government and its leaders are providers. In order to provide for its citizens, 
the government is allocated an immense amount of power. The power allotted to the 
controlling political party of NK enabled Kim Il-Sung and the KWP to create authority and 
legal systems. Moreover, the group structure required by the authority system limited the 
types of social roles available to citizens and, further, required individuals to subscribe to 
those roles or risk being viewed as enemies of the nation. For example, several interviewees 
testified that loyalty to Kim Il-Sung and the KWP was the primary rule in NK (Bok, Hyuk, 
and Soon as cited in Kirby et al., 2013d, 2013f, 2013h). Brannigan & Hardwick 
acknowledge that the authority system will play a role in the dispersion and socialization 
of primary group beliefs, however this case study of North Korea finds that the authority 
system influenced group socialization as well as group structure and dynamics. This 
analysis suggests that political ideology determines the extent to which authority and legal 
systems influence these transitions.  
As Maier-Katkin et al. notes, CAH are more likely to occur in societies whose belief 
systems value self-interest, dehumanization, and violence. The level of control 
implemented by the North Korean government perpetuated fear among citizens that 
encouraged the dispersion of a belief system that valued the policies of nationalism and 
juche established by Kim Il-Sung and the KWP. Additionally, the power allotted to the 
government of NK allowed Kim Il-Sung and the KWP to implement policies aimed at 
isolating the population from the international community. On a social level, these policies 
encouraged laws that served the interests of North Korea (i.e. reunification, self-
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sufficiency, and independence). On the individual level, these policies encouraged 
obedience. The limitations placed on communication and movement served to maintain the 
beliefs perpetuated by the authority and law systems. Anyone who opposed the interests of 
the state was deemed a criminal and accordingly viewed as disobedient and a threat to 
reunification, self-sufficiency, and independence. Consequently, North Korea’s prison 
system became a controlled environment under which the displacement of aggression 
occurred.  
Despite theoretical inconsistencies in how the progression of CAH evolved in the 
case of NK as delineated by Brannigan & Hardwick and Maier-Katkin et al., the end result 
was the same: displaced aggression. In NK, ideology and fear facilitated the widespread 
acceptance of Kim Il-Sung’s policies and values. Citizens who expressed resistance to 
these policies and values were subjected to arrest and relocated to revolutionary districts 
or prison camps depending on the nature of the offense. Conversely, citizens who exhibited 
strong ideology were assigned to high ranking government roles, Bowibu police, and 
prison guard roles. Individuals who accepted NK’s forced social roles were viewed as 
productive members of society, whereas individuals who challenged these assigned social 
roles were viewed as traitors and sent to prison, creating sharp divisions among North 
Korean citizens. Those considered “productive” individuals then used this schism to justify 
any and all action against nonconformists—creating conditions for CAH to occur. In 






 The case study indicates that CAH in NK occurred as a result of several factors 
including intense, widespread strain, primary group affiliations and socialization, group 
structure and dynamics, belief systems, and the displacement of aggression.  Additionally, 
the case study has highlighted how this theoretical outline might be improved. Specifically, 
isolation and political ideology appear to have contributed to CAH in the case of North 
Korea. In order to illustrate the theoretical implications of the North Korean case study, a 
revised theoretical outline is proposed in Figure 5.1. Understanding how and why CAH 
occurred in NK is essential to the development of effective policies aimed at eliminating 
ongoing violations and preventing future violations. This thesis has explored the 
phenomena of CAH and has also expanded the explanation of how and why such crimes 
occur. In addition, this thesis has also challenged the characterizations of CAH as defined 
by international law.  
Future research should continue to explore the development of the international 
justice system and accordingly challenge the systems that have been and are being 
established. Furthermore, criminologist should work with academics from other disciplines 
to create more surveys like the Atrocities Documentation Survey in order to further the 
understanding of the magnitude of CAH violations. Considering the North Korean case, 
research should continue to challenge the definitions of CAH within international law. For 
example, should the coercion of a large population be considered a crime against 
humanity? Finally, future research should continue to study previous CAH violations in 
effort to identify additional precursors to CAH. This will aid international institutions in 
the creation of international monitoring and intervention agencies.  
74 
 
Figure 5.1 Revised Theoretical Outline 
INTENSE, WIDESPREAD 
STRAIN occurs on a social and 
individual level as a precursor to 
CAH. Strain produces high 
levels of fear. Certain events are 
easily identifiable as strain (i.e. 
war, famine, economic 
depression), because these events 
threaten personal security and 
demarcates indidviduals. 
Political and economic isolation 
represent an additional precursor 
to CAH. Intensity and prevalence 
of strain and isolation will 
determine the likelyhood that 
CAH will ensue. 
Widespread fear results in the 
deterioriation of conventional social bonds 
leading to the formation of  NEW 
PRIMARY GROUP AFFILIATIONS 
built around an "us v. them" mentality. 
This mentality encourages individuals to 
form groups with people who share 
similar beliefs. Large-scale political shifts 
foster the "us v. them" mentality and 
provides a conventional arena for those 
with similar beliefs to congregate.
PRIMARY GROUP SOCIALIZATION 
legitimizes group actions, which clouds 
culpability-- this is espcially true for 
structured groups that value obedience. 
Politcal ideologies that encourage 
obedience will control the construction of 
new group processes.
The GROUP STRUCTURE AND 
DYNAMICS of the new primary group 
structure are influenced by the intensity 
and prevalence of strain as well as the 
diffusion of socialization into social roles. 
Group structure determines authority and 
law systems. Authority and law systems 
influence the availability of social roles. 
CAH are more likely to occur when 
"ordinary" individuals subscribe to the 
new social roles assigned to them by the 
authority system. Following the formation 
of new primary group structures, normal 
group processes of socialization and 
conformity ensue. 
CAH are more likley to occur in 
groups whose BELIEF 
SYSTEMS encourage values 
often associated with immediate 
self-interest, dehumanization 
and violence. These beliefs are 
legitimized through group 
action. Moreover, authority and 
law systems will play a role in 
the dispersion and socialization 
of primary group beliefs. 
This process will likely result in the 
DISPLACEMENT OF 
AGGRESSION. Primary group 
structure, group action, group 
dynamics, and group beliefs will 
encourge the use of violence, which 




Existing theories identify precursors of CAH, which this study has generally 
supported. Thus, the possibility that CAH will ensue is identifiable prior to international 
law violation. Additionally, following Agnew’s logic, strain as a precursor to CAH can 
even be minimized. This reasoning suggests that intervention programs aimed at 
minimizing intense, widespread strain may be beneficial to quelling potential CAH 
violations. Since the Nuremburg Trials the international community has focused its 
attention on the creation of an international criminal justice system. However, existing 
theories of CAH as well as the analysis reported in this thesis recommends that additional 
international efforts to intervene in high risk CAH situations should be the focus of future 
policies. Additionally, the case study highlights the complicated nature of CAH in that 
many factors must occur, either sequentially or simultaneously, in order for CAH to 
commence. For crimes in which culpability is hard to determine, programs based on 
restorative justice may be more effective at quelling the emergence and continuation of 
CAH. Specifically, the North Korean case study demonstrates that CAH violations 
occurred for several decades with little acknowledgement from the international 
community. In these cases in which time clouds culpability, restorative justice programs 
may contribute more to the reconstruction process. Generally, Restorative Justice is 
considered, “a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come 
together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its 
implications for the future” (Marshall as cited by Gade, 2013, p. 17). 
Criminology recognizes that a multitude of factors affect criminality within a 
society. Specifically, the case study of NK demonstrates the multifaceted nature of CAH. 
Consequently, in order for international laws to be viewed as legitimate, they must be 
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written in such a manner that holds responsible parties culpable. Again, the North Korean 
case study demonstrates how it may be difficult to identify culpable parties in an ever-
changing environment like the international community. In addition, it can be challenging 
to hold responsible parties culpable when atrocities have been occurring for decades. 
Therefore international laws should focus less on retribution and more on restoring 
conventional bonds.  
 The case study of NK has provided numerous examples of how the international 
community has responded to North Korean law violations. However, reactions from 
international community have been limited. For example, the complexity of the Korean 
War diverted an international response. Though the USSR and the US came to an 
agreement that ended the War, punishment was deemed unnecessary—no nation was held 
accountable for the devastation of the War even though Kim Il-Sung played an integral 
role in the onset of the conflict. As a result, North Korea has successfully isolated itself for 
the last 55 years. However, similarly situated cases within the international community 
have resulted in the establishment of ICTs and despite their relative ineffectiveness, the 
establishment of ICTs does draw attention to CAH violations. Accordingly, the analysis 
presented in this thesis proposes that either an ICT or a reconciliation committee be 
established to intervene, monitor, and prosecute CAH violations in NK. ICTs have been 
established in many cases of possible CAH violations however, reconciliation committees 
have not been as relied upon by the international community. The most renowned 
reconciliation committee was established in South Africa at the end of apartheid.  
In 1995, the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was established through 
South African legislative measures. Between 1948 and 1994, South Africa experienced a 
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period of state-sponsored racial segregation known as apartheid. The TRC was South 
Africa’s attempt at reuniting their nation. The TRC was comprised of three committees: 
the human rights violation committee, the reparation and rehabilitation committee, and the 
amnesty committee (Gade, 2013). The human rights committee was charged with 
investigating violations during apartheid. The reparation and rehabilitation committee was 
responsible for the creation of proposals aimed at rebuilding and strengthening the 
community. The amnesty committee reviewed applications for exoneration utilizing a three 
prong test. The crimes must have been: (1) politically motivated, (2) proportionate, and (3) 
perpetrators must fully disclose the nature of their crimes (Gade, 2013). The international 
community might use this structure in the creation of an international reconciliation 
institution or in the formation of international reconciliation committees.  
Criminologist have much to offer in the debate on how the international community 
should handle North Korean relations. The overarching international goal is to encourage 
North Korean desistance from CAH and in general, international desistance from CAH. 
The willingness to testify demonstrated by COI interviewees suggests that the North 
Korean authority’s political capacity may be diminishing. This could provide the 
international community an opportunity to reach out to NK and effect its future policies. 
The globalization of crime requires that criminologists delve into the study of such crimes 
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